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Abstract 
 
 
  A dataset of 854 small unmanned aerial system (SUAS) flight experiments from 
2005-2009 is analyzed to determine significant factors that contribute to mishaps. The 
data from 29 airframes of different designs and technology readiness levels were 
aggregated. Twenty measured parameters from each flight experiment are investigated, 
including wind speed, pilot experience, number of prior flights, pilot currency, etc. 
Outcomes of failures (loss of flight data) and damage (injury to airframe) are classified 
by logistic regression modeling and artificial neural network analysis. 
 From the analysis, it can be concluded that SUAS damage is a random event that 
cannot be predicted with greater accuracy than guessing. Failures can be predicted with 
greater accuracy (38.5% occurrence, model hit rate 69.6%). Five significant factors were 
identified by both the neural networks and logistic regression.  
SUAS prototypes risk failures at six times the odds of their commercially 
manufactured counterparts. Likewise, manually controlled SUAS have twice the odds of 
experiencing a failure as those autonomously controlled. Wind speeds, pilot experience, 
and pilot currency were not found to be statistically significant to flight outcomes. The 
implications of these results for decision makers, range safety officers and test engineers 
are discussed.
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MODELING SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM MISHAPS USING LOGISTIC 
 
REGRESSION AND ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS) are proliferating throughout the armed 
forces, law enforcement and civilian sectors. There are tens of thousands of SUAS in 
service around the world, comprising hundreds of unique airframes used for dozens of 
diverse missions. Miniaturization, improvements in autopilot technology and the 
development of advanced batteries have enabled SUAS to flourish where once only 
larger Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) were feasible.  
This explosion in the SUAS population has meant great gains for military units 
who now can quickly employ a cheap reconnaissance platform without risking a pilot, or 
an expensive aircraft. However, UAS in general, both large and small, tend to be much 
less reliable than manned systems. The extent of current UAS analysis has been limited 
to large systems, and the results of that analysis are not encouraging. Large UAS across 
all platforms and services have historically seen mishap rates one to two orders of 
magnitude higher than manned aircraft (OSD 2009). 
Reliability is a critical issue for all UAS because “it underlies their affordability 
(an acquisitions issue), their mission availability (an operations and logistics issue), and 
their acceptance into civil airspace (a regulatory issue)” (OSD 2003). Given the dearth of 
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data for SUAS, organizations like the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are 
hesitant to grant Certificates of Authorization (COAs) for SUAS flight in the National 
Airspace (NAS). Research organizations like the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) 
must make important acquisition and flight testing decisions about this often 
unpredictable technology, putting money and flight test safety at risk in the process. 
Operational units purchase and fly SUAS platforms, putting their mission effectiveness 
and troop safety in the hands of a technology with little published data. With data on 
SUAS reliability, informed decisions could be made across the spectrum of SUAS 
operations, from the regulatory side through development, test and evaluation, to 
operational deployment of these systems. With an understanding of the unique nature of 
SUAS and insight into the causes of their mishap rates, millions of dollars could 
potentially be saved throughout the acquisitions lifecycle of this technology. 
This thesis uses a dataset of SUAS flights from AFRL’s Munitions Directorate to 
ascertain the root causes of SUAS mishaps to exploit them for process improvement and 
lead to future mishap prevention. AFRL flies over two dozen types of SUAS with 
wingspans from 20 inches to 11 feet and weights from one to 100 pounds. They use a 
mixture of electric and gasoline propulsion. AFRL’s SUAS fleet represents a wide swath 
of the sizes, payloads and propulsion types found in the general SUAS population. The 
dataset that AFRL provided for this analysis is composed of five years’ worth of SUAS 
experimental flight testing (from 2005-2009) with over 850 unique flights, 29 unique 
airframes and 103 different tail numbers. The results of each flight were recorded in 
flight reports and root causes were identified or hypothesized for all mishaps and aircraft 
damage. In all, 19 unique parameters were extracted or derived from the flight reports, 
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including surface wind speed, ambient temperature, pilot’s previous number of flights, 
days since airframe last flown, wingspan of airframe, and time of day flown. 
This thesis utilizes multivariate data analysis techniques to attempt to classify 
flights by mishap potential based on AFRL’s historical records and the parameters that 
can be obtained prior to flight. Logistic regression is employed to develop classification 
functions and to quantity the impact of key factors on mishaps. Artificial neural network 
feature screening techniques are utilized to identify the most significant factors for 
classifying SUAS mishaps so that they can be investigated for process improvement. The 
root causes of SUAS mishaps are then exploited to create mishap prevention strategies. 
Existing mishap prevention strategies for large UAS are considered and analyzed for their 
potential applicability to SUAS in light of the mishap factors identified by this analysis. 
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II.  Literature Review 
 
 
 
To date, there have been no published statistics on SUAS reliability, although in 
the past 10 years, some reports on UAS reliability have been generated for larger 
platforms. An explanation for this lack of detail in early research was offered by the FAA 
in 2004: “[military UAS] are much less expensive than manned aircraft and so do not 
warrant the same level of analysis” (Williams 2004). That may have been true in 2004 
but today, when the military services are spending hundreds of millions of dollars 
acquiring SUAS, the justification for further analysis is clear.  
 
Mishap Reports 
 
The primary mechanism by which to track large UAS reliability is via mishap 
reports. Mishap reports document incidents in which an aircraft caused unintended 
damage exceeding a certain dollar amount or injuries to friendly personnel or 
noncombatants. As Nullmeyer, Herz and Montijo (2009) point out, “It is clear that 
mishap frequencies, rates and causes are all dynamic in the emerging field of UAS 
operations, and that mishap reports provide a fertile source of insight into where training 
and operations need to be improved.” 
Mishap classification in the Department of Defense is governed by DoD 
Instruction 6055.07, “Mishap Notification, Investigation, Reporting, and Record 
Keeping”. This document defines responsibilities and procedures for mishap 
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investigations and provides the classification scheme to be used by the component 
services. DoDI 6055.07 lists the following mishap classifications: 
Class A mishap.  The resulting total cost of damages to Government and other 
property is $2 million or more, a DoD aircraft is destroyed (excluding UAS 
Groups 1, 2, or 3), or an injury or occupational illness results in a fatality or 
permanent total disability.  
Class B mishap.  The resulting total cost of damages to Government and other 
property is $500,000 or more, but less than $2 million.  An injury or occupational 
illness results in permanent partial disability, or when three or more personnel are 
hospitalized for inpatient care (which, for mishap reporting purposes only, does 
not include just observation or diagnostic care) as a result of a single mishap.  
Class C mishap.  The resulting total cost of property damages to Government and 
other property is $50,000 or more, but less than $500,000; or a nonfatal injury or 
illness that results in 1 or more days away from work, not including the day of the 
injury.  
Class D mishap.  The resulting total cost of property damage is $20,000 or more, 
but less than $50,000; or a recordable injury or illness not otherwise classified as 
a Class A, B, or C mishap. 
 
Maintenance records and flight logs are not generally accessible for analysis, but 
mishap statistics are collected and published by the different branches of the military. The 
mishap reports generated from these events for large UAS have been collected and 
analyzed by several scholars who sort and group the mishap causes into different 
classifications. 
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Mishap Factors 
A consensus opinion to emerge from analysis of the data is that large UAS have a 
much higher mishap rate than manned aircraft (Williams 2004). This has been attributed 
to numerous factors. Human error was the most often cited cause. In early studies, it was 
found to comprise anywhere from 21% to 80% of all mishaps (Williams 2004). More 
recent studies have found that human error is a mishap cause in a range between 56-69% 
of all mishaps (Tvaryanas and Thompson 2008). The other mishap factors are often 
lumped under general categories, like “engine” or “structure” for those cases when a 
cause has been determined at all. 
The mishap factors varied in extent by aircraft. Given that the different branches 
of the military fly differing UAS, the mishap rates varied by service. The difficulty in 
comparing these human factors mishap rates across systems was summarized well by 
Williams: “[M]ost of the other human factors-related accidents were unique in the sense 
that a problem that occurred for one type of aircraft would never be seen for another 
because the user interfaces for the aircraft are totally different” (Williams 2004).  
The majority of research into the causes of these mishaps has focused on the 
human factors involved. This is because engineering solutions are expected to progress as 
they have for manned systems and gradually yield lower UAS mishap rates with system 
maturation (Nullmeyer, Herz and Montijo 2009). Indeed, optimism has been expressed 
that these engineering and automation improvements would lead to reduced human 
factors errors as well: “The effect of human error is expected to decrease as the level of 
autonomy increases and operators gain more experience” (Dalamagkidis, Valavanis and 
 7   
Piegl 2008). These improvements are expected to occur over time, as they do for all new 
technologies, therefore, the majority of literature on UAS mishaps has concentrated on 
human factors, which is viewed as an area that can be immediately exploited for process 
improvement. 
An overlap between the human factors and technical causes of mishaps is that of 
time, usually measured in number of flight hours. UAS safety performance is expected to 
improve in most measures given more time to learn the intricacies of these complex 
systems. Failure rates should be nonlinear and decreasing after “increased experience in 
the operation of a given UAS type” (Clothier, et al. 2011).  Additionally, OSD reports 
that large UAS have seen improvements in mishap rates over recent years, with their 
measured “reliability approaching an equivalent level of reliability to their manned 
military counterparts” (OSD 2009). OSD expects, therefore, that large UAS mishap rates 
will improve over time, specifically due to “flight experience” and “improved 
technologies” (OSD 2009). Time is thus expected to correlate with increased human 
performance and decreased technical risks.   
 
Technical Risks and Reliability 
Researchers have hypothesized other technical risks to manned and unmanned 
aircraft operations that may not be time- or learning-curve-dependent, including 
atmospheric conditions and maintenance reports. For UAS, NASA’s experience has 
shown that “the most important operational consideration for flight has become the 
weather” (Teets, et al. 1998). Specifically within weather considerations, NASA found 
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wind speed and direction to be the most important meteorological consideration (Teets, et 
al. 1998). While the above assertions are based on NASA’s experience, and support their 
call for better atmospheric data characterization, no data were provided to quantify the 
effect of climate on UAS performance. Quantifiable research by the US Air Force has 
considered the effect of average surface temperature at a pilot’s home base as a potential 
mishap factor for manned aircraft. The results revealed “no significant statistical 
correlation between extreme surface temperatures at home station and the flight mishap 
rates” (Miarecki and Constable, 2007). Likewise, Marine Corps monthly maintenance 
reports were analyzed to determine if their contents could predict future AV-8 Harrier 
mishaps, but no statistically significant model was found (Van Houten 1994). While these 
two empirical results pertain to manned aircraft, each address important factors to 
consider for SUAS, although no comparable studies for UAS of any size have been 
found. 
Some studies of SUAS reliability have considered Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Each involve engineering practices where 
the system is defined as subsystems or components and their individual reliabilities are 
analyzed to determine likelihood of faults and their resulting risk scenarios. Cline (2008) 
attests that FTA and FMEA serve as useful tools for determining levels of SUAS 
reliability and Dermentzoudis (2004) proposes a set of fault trees for a generic UAS. The 
generality of those fault trees makes them adaptable to many potential UAS platforms, 
but they require certain assumptions about the UAS (such as a gas-powered engine, two 
wings, separate ailerons and elevators, the presence of rudders, etc.) that are not 
applicable across UAS platforms. The FTA and FMEA analyses proposed for SUAS 
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platforms are normative rather than descriptive and are decidedly nonspecific because 
SUAS reliability data is not readily available for analysis (Dermentzoudis 2004).  
 
Human Factors 
The data available for large UAS mishaps tend to point to human factors as the 
most prevalent mishap factor. Different conclusions as to the extent and categories of 
human factors involved have been reached by researchers in part because there are a 
number of different ways to analyze the data resulting from mishap investigations. Due to 
the large number of classification schemes available, it is important to decide which one 
to use to classify risk factors prior to initiating analysis (Ballesteros 2007).  
The DoD has developed the Department of Defense Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (DoD HFACS) to provide a common framework to classify and 
analyze human factors for mishap investigation (DoD 2005). This framework creates a 
taxonomy that is more descriptive than simply reporting “operator error” as a mishap 
cause (DoD 2005). The taxonomy is derived from work by Reason (1990) and Wiegmann 
and Shappell (2003) and is based on the concepts of active failures and latent 
failures/conditions resulting from hazards present in four different levels of 
responsibility. Mishaps are theorized to occur when hazards align across these four levels 
(see Figure 1). That is, it takes failures from the organizational and supervisory levels to 
permit the occurrence of preconditions for unsafe acts which ultimately result in active 
failures (mishaps). The DoD HFACS classification system has been used to categorize 
the human factors deemed responsible for large UAS mishaps. It relies on human 
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judgment to assign categories to the human error, so the conclusions resulting from 
analysis of these categorizations have varied by investigator, platform, and timeframe.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. DoD HFACS levels (DoD 2005), based on work by (Reason 1990) 
 
The major result from DoD HFACS analysis of aviation mishaps has been to 
identify Crew Resource Management (CRM) and Operational Risk Management (ORM) 
as main contributing factors to manned aviation mishaps, and Perceptual Errors as the 
main contributing human factor to Air Force UAS mishaps. An HFACS analysis of 124 
Class A mishaps across manned aircraft revealed failures in CRM and ORM as common 
mishap causes (Gibb 2006). This meant that errors in communication between 
crewmembers, or failure to properly plan missions by ensuring aircrew proficiency, were 
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most often contributory to these mishaps. Large UAS, while generally having similar 
CRM and ORM considerations as manned aircraft, showed somewhat different results. 
Perceptual errors, suggestive of poor situational awareness, exacerbated by the 
peculiarities of UAS technology, were the leading cause of mishaps in US Air Force MQ-
1 Predator UAS (Tvaryanas and Thompson 2006). Another analysis of the MQ-1 
Predator with updated mishap data concluded that both perception and skill-based errors 
contributed the most to mishaps, but also shared similar latent failures (Tvaryanas and 
Thompson 2008). This means that MQ-1 mishaps that resulted from skill-based errors or 
perceptual factors had common antecedent hazards in the higher levels of the DoD 
HFACS taxonomy.  
In a broad survey of UAS mishaps across all military branches, no major, 
common factors were isolated across the services (Tvaryanas, Thompson and Constable 
2006). Instead, the Air Force tended to experience operator error from 
instrumentation/sensory feedback systems, automation and channelized attention, the 
Army saw latent organizational influences manifested as failures in guidance, training, 
and overconfidence, while the Navy and Marines were impacted by more complex 
factors closely associated with “workload and attention” and “risk management” 
(Tvaryanas and Thompson 2008). The HFACS analysis indicates that the Air Force has 
common failures in perceptual and sensory factors, possibly made worse by the 
technology employed by their UAS platforms. The other services and manned aircraft 
showed no common human factors. The commonality across Air Force mishaps gives 
hope that these latent and active human factors errors can be exploited for mishap rate 
improvement. 
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One caution should be noted about using human factors classification for 
mishaps; investigative biases may be present which are only reinforced by the labeling or 
relabeling of error (Dekker 2003). Researchers report the existence of hindsight bias, 
which is “the tendency for people with outcome knowledge to believe falsely that they 
would have predicted the reported outcome of an event” (Hawkins and Hastie 1990). This 
bias could impact the trustworthiness of mishap reports and the subsequent classifications 
of human error, as investigators may find fault in areas that are obvious in hindsight, but 
may not have been at the time of the mishap. This hindsight bias is “especially likely to 
occur when the focal event has well-defined alternative outcomes (e.g. win-lose)” 
(Hawkins and Hastie 1990), which makes it a potentially serious problem given the 
“mishap”-“no mishap” outcomes that are investigated. Hindsight bias, coupled with the 
practice of classifying error, “disembodies data…by excising performance fragments 
away from their context” (Dekker 2003). One theory of error is that humans perform 
erroneous actions which are viewed as rational from within their circumstances but which 
are not rational when viewed from the outside or in hindsight. Under this theory of “local 
rationality” any mishaps that occur are likely to reoccur as future individuals repeat the 
same locally rational acts, while a classification scheme on these errors merely provides a 
label to what in reality is a complex underlying problem (Dekker 2003). These 
underlying weaknesses in mishap reporting and classification are duly noted, but must be 
accepted in order to gain insights that can come from classification of SUAS mishaps, 
because these insights could lead to the mitigation of SUAS operational risks.  
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SUAS Risk Analysis 
The risk scenarios commonly identified for UAS are mid-air collisions, ground 
impacts, and loss of the UAS platform. Despite many years of FAA data and several 
different models to predict the consequences of these risk scenarios, “there is currently no 
consensus on the specification of airworthiness regulations for UAS” (Clothier, et al. 
2011). The major risks and their anticipated impacts are discussed in detail below. 
The single most significant hazard for a UAS platform is a mid-air collision. This 
hazard is the primary one keeping civil UAS from being integrated into the NAS by the 
FAA (Clothier, et al. 2011). Mid-air collisions are a threat to both manned and unmanned 
aircraft operating in the vicinity of UAS. FAA reports through 2007 have only 
documented “a small number of incidents” of mid-air collisions between civil aircraft and 
remote control (R/C) airplanes, which all occurred between 1993 and 1998 and were 
attributed to lack of situational awareness in the manned aircraft, or violations of airspace 
rules and procedures by the remote pilots (Dalamagkidis, Valavanis and Piegl 2008). 
Despite the fact that no further data is available to quantify the consequences of mid-air 
collisions, (Dalamagkidis, Valavanis and Piegl 2008) believe that current regulations on 
R/C aircraft (which are vehicles similar to the size and performance of the SUAS under 
consideration in this thesis) are sufficient to ensure acceptable safety levels.  
Ground impacts also pose a serious hazard for UAS operations. Several models 
have been developed to better quantify the risks associated with an impact to individuals 
and property. A blunt criterion estimation model for injury potential was developed for 
SUAS which computes the likelihood of a fatality based on a direct chest impact 
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(Magister 2010). When this model is applied to the airspeeds, frontal areas, and average 
mass of the SUAS considered in this thesis, most are shown to be at low risk for a 
fatality, even under the worst-case scenarios assumed by the model. A ground impact 
analysis performed by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology suggested 
that micro UAS (less than 2lb, less than 500ft altitude) posed a “relatively low risk” in 
general and that mini UAS (2 to 30 lb at 100 to 10,000ft altitude) could be flown over 
95% of the country with low reliability requirements (Weibel and Hansman 2005). While 
the primary calculations of these models are in terms of fatalities, property on the ground 
can be damaged as well and injuries can be sustained, but neither of these two outcomes 
is taken as seriously as the potential for a fatality, and thus the numbers are not found in 
these types of analysis. 
The last major risk scenario is the loss of the SUAS itself. This poses costs to the 
SUAS’s organization both monetarily and in terms of lost mission capability. The 
minimum threshold for mishap reporting in the US Air Force is that of a Class C mishap, 
which involves any damage over $50,000. Many SUAS, like the ones flown by 
AFRL/RWWV, even if they were to be completely destroyed in a mishap, do not cost 
enough to meet that minimum threshold. When UAS mishaps occur, even if only 
resulting in minor damage to or loss of the UAS, they still have important policy and 
mission impacts. Four documented Canadian UAS mishaps in Afghanistan, while only 
damaging the aircraft themselves, nonetheless were said to have “created considerable 
risks for units that must retrieve these vehicles” and to have “increase[d] the workload on 
investigatory agencies” (Johnson 2008). Likewise, on the Eglin AFB range, there is a 
common UAS test requirement to report all aircraft that fly out of control or that exit 
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airspace boundaries. While any SUAS incidents that could meet these criteria may not 
have caused any harm to persons or property on the ground, the incidents still require 
reporting and possible investigation. The risk scenarios in SUAS operations are 
considerable, but the likelihoods of these scenarios occurring have not been investigated 
for SUAS.  
Because little data exist on SUAS reliability, no empirical estimates are available 
to establish the likelihood of the aforementioned risk scenarios. Since risk assessment is 
comprised of a scenario, its likelihood of occurrence, and its consequence (Haimes 2009), 
the overall risks of SUAS operations have not been well-quantified. For example, the 
model for ground impact by Weibel and Hansman (2005) was used to calculate a 
necessary mean time between failures (MTBF) to ensure reliable UAS operation for a 
given population density, rather than computing actual reliability data from active 
systems. The model by Magister (2010) assumes a chest impact and merely quantifies the 
subsequent likelihood of a fatality, but does not seek to determine the probability of an 
SUAS colliding with a person’s chest.  
 
Overview of Mishap Prevention 
The risks posed by UAS are deemed sufficient to warrant preventive actions. 
Many programs aimed at mishap reduction have been implemented for large UAS 
including: training, CRM, and medical screening. Additionally, research has examined 
pilot qualifications and the background experience necessary to make better UAS pilots. 
For the preventive actions that have had their effectiveness measured, the results are 
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largely inconclusive, demonstrating that there may not be a clear extension from them to 
prevent SUAS mishaps. 
Many factors influence which prevention measures should be considered, 
including the cost and effectiveness of the proposed measures. Although literature on 
prevention is often found in a medical context, the basic principles of prevention are 
applicable across disciplines. The statement: “Research needs to be conducted before 
policies and programs are implemented when systematic reviews determine that scientific 
information is scant and where gaps in knowledge about prevention exist,” (Jones, 
Canham-Chervak and Sleet 2010) is as applicable to the medical field as it is to SUAS 
risk management. The health framework for prevention concludes that priority in 
preventive measures be allocated to those programs which have scientific evidence of 
effective prevention, and especially those which can produce it at the lowest cost (Jones, 
Canham-Chervak and Sleet 2010). This approach has been advocated in the aviation 
community as well: “in order to make best use of available resources prevention 
measures should focus on the areas with the greatest return…that are most manageable 
and those where the precursors are more susceptible to an antidote” (Gibb 2006). A 
survey of manned aircraft and large UAS preventive measures and their results may 
provide insight to determine the priority that decision makers should consider for SUAS 
mishap prevention. 
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Mishap Prevention Focused on Human Factors 
One of the earliest manned aircraft mishap interventions was CRM, a training 
program introduced in the 1970s to reduce errors by focusing on human factors causes 
(Joint Aviation Authorities 2003). While CRM seems to produce positive responses in 
trainees, the gains from the program on flight safety are inconclusive (Salas, et al. 2001). 
Despite its lack of statistically significant success with manned aircraft, a CRM training 
program has been proposed as a preventive measure for the Indian Air Force’s UAS 
operators (Sharma and Chakravarti 2005). CRM training has been introduced for USAF 
Predator operators (Nullmeyer, Herz and Montijo 2009), but the effects of that training 
have not been quantified. The use of CRM as an effective prevention for manned and 
unmanned aircraft mishaps remains to be seen, as insufficient data exist for analysis that 
may support or refute its efficacy. 
Some preventive measures for large UAS have focused on pilot qualifications and 
screening. Given that human factors play a significant role in causing UAS mishaps, 
studies have been undertaken to determine if proper pilot selection can prevent mishaps. 
Schreiber, et al. (2002) found that on a high-fidelity Predator flight simulator, about 150-
200 hours of previous flight experience was required to match the performance of Air 
Force pilots that are currently selected for Predator training. This means that an 
individual with a civilian pilot’s license or one who had just completed T-38 training was 
as skilled at the simulation as an operational pilot with no previous Predator experience, 
implying that the skills needed for UAS operation may be enhanced with any prior flight 
experience. The study’s authors are quick to note that experienced manned pilots who 
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switch over to UAS may have to “unlearn” some skills they have learned in the cockpit as 
the sensory environment is much different for UAS (Schreiber, et al. 2002). In a study by 
Tvaryanas, Thompson and Constable (2006), which looked at multiple UAS platforms 
across the services, the authors found that “experienced military pilot UAV operators 
made as many bad decisions as enlisted UAV operators without prior military flight 
training or experience” which suggests that limiting UAS pilots to rated officers may not 
improve overall flight safety. Lastly, the FAA has proposed screening UAS pilots for 
civil operations with a second-class medical certification in the hopes of reducing the 
level of risk associated with pilot incapacitation (Williams 2007). This recommended 
certification level is justified by noting that manned aircraft with similar missions that 
operate in the proposed airspace have second-class certification requirements for their 
pilots, although it is conceded that waivers are available for anyone who can demonstrate 
safe aircraft operation (Williams 2007). Since these are proposed rules, no data exist to 
quantify their effect on flight safety. Pilot screening and minimum qualification 
requirements for UAS operations may only be beneficial when prior flight experience is 
taken into account, regardless of rank or medical status. 
 
Mishap Prevention Focused on Technical Factors 
Technical preventive measures are introduced frequently in the UAS world: this 
thesis itself is based on using data gathered while testing new technical innovations for 
SUAS platforms. The technical risk factors for UAS mishaps previously discussed are 
largely inconclusive and may not justify a technical intervention. While it is assumed that 
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technological advances will proceed as the development of UAS platforms proceeds, 
several authors caution that adding technology to already complex systems may degrade 
performance. “There will be situations where the solution increases the complexity of the 
system and, as a secondary effect, reduces the risk of one factor while increasing that of 
another” (Ballesteros 2007). These effects are most pronounced in systems with 
“interactive complexity” and “tight coupling”, which refers to systems like aircraft where 
cause and effect are nonlinear with quick propagation of events through the system 
(Perrow 1999). Fixes to these systems, “including safety devices, sometimes create new 
accidents” (Perrow 1999). For that reason, technological fixes should be approached 
cautiously lest their added complexity increase the risk of the type of accidents they seek 
to prevent. 
Several specific preventive technical measures have been proposed to increase the 
reliability and safety of UAS operations, primarily automated landing capability and 
sense-and-avoid. These two measures are proposed to allow UAS to perform at levels of 
safety equivalent to manned aircraft. This is an important consideration for integrating 
UAS in the NAS (Mejias, et al. 2009), and has potential to improve reliability figures for 
UAS across all operational domains.  
Automated landing capabilities are cited as having great potential to reduce UAS 
mishaps. The RQ-7 Shadow UAS, flown by the Army, is equipped with a tactical 
automated landing system (TALS) to eliminate external pilot landing errors. TALS is far 
from perfect, causing 25% of Shadow mishaps as analyzed by (Williams 2004). This 
system also requires operators to setup a landing site in advance with equipment 
preplaced near the runway. In research conducted by (Mejias, et al. 2009), an automated 
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landing system was proposed that allows logic onboard the UAS to select the optimal 
landing site in an emergency situation, eliminating the need for ground crew and setup 
time. Regarding increases in automation in general, (Williams 2004) states that “the use 
of automation to overcome human frailties does not completely solve the problem, as the 
automation itself can fail”. These automated landing approaches have promise for 
reducing UAS mishaps, although affirmative results have not yet been obtained and their 
added complexity may be problematic. 
Sense and avoid (SAA) is a preventive measure that would allow UAS to detect 
other airborne traffic and avoid a collision. This technology has been mandated by 
regulations, particularly FAA Order 7610.4, which requires SAA systems to perform as 
well as manned aircraft (Carney, Walker and Corke 2006). SAA would lower the 
probability of the most severe risk scenario facing UAS (a mid-air collision), and is a 
requirement before UAS can be integrated into the NAS. These systems have not yet 
been implemented on UAS platforms despite some successful demonstrations, because 
“testing without access to the NAS is problematic” (Dalamagkidis, Valavanis and Piegl 
2008). 
 
AFRL’s SUAS Program Background 
The Air Force Research Laboratory’s Munitions Directorate (AFRL/RW) has 
been performing flight experiments on SUAS since at least 2005. The directorate uses 
computer aided design and manufacturing techniques with rapid-prototyping equipment 
to create and modify SUAS vehicles for a variety of missions. AFRL/RW has produced 
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several vehicles of note, including the BATCAM and GENMAV. The Flight Vehicles 
Integration Branch (AFRL/RWWV) not only designs aircraft but tailors existing 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) remote control aircraft for flight experiments. 
AFRL/RWWV has a varied mission, both designing and flying experimental SUAS to 
determine the feasibility of new technologies, and integrating customer payloads into 
existing SUAS platforms to provide flight data.  
The BATCAM (see Figure 2) is an example of an aircraft designed by AFRL/RW 
to push the technological boundaries. The BATCAM was designed as a battlefield 
surveillance platform for the USAF’s Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) kit. The vehicle 
is a man-portable SUAS capable of being hand-launched by operators and was designed 
to prove that compact surveillance vehicles were technologically feasible.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. BATCAM SUAS developed by AFRL (Abate, Stewart and Babcock 2009) 
 
 
The GENMAV (see Figure 3) is an aircraft designed by AFRL/RW as a 
technology demonstration platform. The GENMAV was originally conceived as a 
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baseline configuration for basic aerodynamic research. It has been used for that research, 
but has also been modified to characterize flight maneuvers with flexible wings and has 
been outfitted with different payloads for parachute recovery experimentation. These are 
two of the over two-dozen SUAS flown by AFRL/RWWV since 2005.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. GENMAV SUAS developed by AFRL (Abate, Stewart and Babcock 2009) 
 
 
The aircraft flown by AFRL span a wide range of the SUAS category. They vary 
in wingspan from 20 inches to 11 feet, with takeoff weights under 100 pounds. The larger 
SUAS are gasoline powered while the smaller ones are battery-powered with electric 
motors. Most are equipped with miniaturized autopilot technology to enable semi-
autonomous flight. The SUAS have three flight modes: autonomous flight with 
waypoints preloaded into memory, semi-autonomous flight where the pilot provides 
directional inputs while the autopilot maintains altitude and speed, and manual flight 
where all commands are given by the pilot. Some aircraft are flown exclusively in 
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autonomous mode, others are flown exclusively manually, and the rest are flown with a 
mix of both depending on their missions and the goals of that particular flight 
experiment. 
AFRL/RWWV operates under AFRL Instructions for its flight test program. Two 
primary documents govern its SUAS operations: AFRLI 61-103 “AFRL Research Test 
Management” and AFRLMAN 99-103 “AFRL Flight Test and Evaluation”. The first 
document outlines the general policy for testing in AFRL. It contains a risk assessment 
matrix (see Figure 4) for test planning which allows program managers to determine the 
level of risk each test poses which in turn determines the appropriate level of approval. 
The dearth of SUAS data makes filling out this risk matrix highly subjective, as the 
consequences are frequently unknown and their likelihoods have not been formally 
quantified. AFRLI 61-103 defines a mishap as “unplanned events or range operations 
resulting in loss/damage to DoD or private property, injury, departure from range 
boundaries, or public endangerment”. The second document, AFRLMAN 99-103, defines 
Class A through C mishaps much like the DoD classification, except that the dollar 
figures are lower (AFRLMAN 99-103 is an older document). The AFRL manual notes 
that Class D mishaps are not applicable to flight-related mishaps and adds a Class E 
category: 
Class E Events: These occurrences do not meet reportable mishap classification 
criteria, but are deemed important to investigate/report for mishap prevention. 
Class E reports provide an expeditious way to disseminate valuable mishap 
prevention information.   
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Figure 4. Risk Assessment Matrix for AFRL Testing. Boxes 1 – 4 denote High Risk 
tests, 5 – 9 are Medium Risk tests, and 10 – 20 are Low Risk tests (AFRLI 61-103) 
 
 
 
Most of the aircraft flown by AFRL/RWWV do not meet the minimum cost levels 
required for Class C mishap reporting. That is, if an SUAS were to crash and be 
completely destroyed, it would not have caused enough damage (in dollars) to warrant a 
Class C mishap investigation and report. Likewise, AFRL/RWWV’s SUAS fleet is 
composed of mostly small vehicles that are highly unlikely to cause fatalities even under 
worst-case scenarios. Therefore, the term “mishap” as defined by the DoD is not 
applicable to the majority of AFRL’s SUAS. Instead, the term “failure” is used for the 
remainder of this thesis. An SUAS failure is said to occur in AFRL/RWWV’s flight 
experimentation program whenever required flight experiment data is not obtained due to 
an SUAS or SUAS operator fault.  
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Since the end product of the flight experiments are data, any SUAS action that 
prevents the planned data from being collected is a failure. For example, if an SUAS fails 
to cleanly launch and crashes on takeoff, that is deemed a failure, as the data from that 
flight is lost. If an SUAS loses communication with the ground station and is forced to 
land before all test points are completed, that, too is a failure, even though no damage 
occurred to the platform. If an SUAS flies approach too steeply and breaks its landing 
gear after all test points have been completed, that is not considered a failure, despite the 
occurrence of damage. The term “failure” is an objective measure of the SUAS’s ability 
to execute its mission for AFRL and is distinct from “damage”, which is quantified 
monetarily to determine a mishap category. 
 
Logistic Regression Modeling 
Logistic regression is an analytical technique used to construct a model describing 
the relationship between a dependent variable with a discrete response and one or more 
explanatory variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). Dichotomous responses (using “0” 
or “1” to indicate the nonoccurrence or occurrence of some outcome, respectively, for 
example) violate many of the assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
including homoscedasticity and normality of residuals (Menard 2002). Additionally, OLS 
regression will produce a model whose range is –∞ to +∞, which violates the 0 to 1 
range for a binary discrete response. An example of a dichotomous response is shown in 
Figure 5. An OLS regression on the data in this plot would be less than 0 for low values 
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of the explanatory variable, and would exceed 1 for high values of the explanatory 
variable. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Example plot of a dichotomous response. 
 
Logistic regression addresses these issues by producing a model with a 
continuous range from 0 to 1 that indicates the probability of membership in group 1 
given the values of explanatory variables (Menard 2002). Logistic regression models also 
have the interpretive benefit of fitting the rate of occurrence of the response variable. 
Figure 6 is a logistic regression model fit to the data from Figure 5 when the explanatory 
variable is divided into seven equally sized groups and the corresponding response rate is 
modeled against their respective midpoints. 
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Figure 6. Logistic regression model, fitted to rate data from Figure 5. 
 
In general for a logistic regression model, let 𝑦 be the dependent variable and ?⃗? be 
the vector of explanatory variable values. The probability of interest is expressed as:  
Pr{𝑦 = 1|?⃗?} = 𝜋(?⃗?). 
The logistic distribution is used to model the probability. It takes the form:  
𝜋(?⃗?) =  
𝑒𝑔(?⃗?)
1 +  𝑒𝑔(?⃗?)
 
where 𝑔(?⃗?) is known as the logit transformation and can be expressed as: 
𝑔(?⃗?) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯+𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝 = 𝑙𝑛 �
𝜋(?⃗?)
1 − 𝜋(?⃗?)
�. 
The logit transformation is comparable to functions used in OLS regression 
because 𝑔(?⃗?) is continuous with a range from –∞ to +∞  and is linear in its parameters. 
The logistic distribution is restricted to a 0 to 1 continuous range, it is a flexible function, 
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and it lends itself well to interpretation(Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). The parameters of 
the logistic function, 𝛽𝑖, are usually estimated iteratively using maximum likelihood 
methods and are important for the model’s interpretation.  
Given a probability of an event occurring, 𝜋(?⃗?), the odds of that event occurring 
are: 
𝜋(?⃗?)
1 − 𝜋(?⃗?)
=  𝑒𝑔(?⃗?). 
The exponentiation of any parameter 𝛽𝑖 represents a ratio of odds when the 
explanatory variable 𝑥𝑖 is increased by one unit. To see this, consider two logistic 
distributions, 𝜋1(?⃗?) and 𝜋2(?⃗?). Let 𝑔1(?⃗?) and 𝑔2(?⃗?) be the logit functions associated 
with each of these distributions, respectively, where 𝑔1(?⃗?) is identical to 𝑔2(?⃗?) except 
that variable 𝑥𝑖 has been increased by one unit: 
𝑔1(?⃗?) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖 + 1) + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝 
and 
𝑔2(?⃗?) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖) + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝. 
The odds ratio of these two logistic distributions becomes: 
𝜋1(?⃗?)
1 − 𝜋1(?⃗?)
𝜋2(?⃗?)
1 − 𝜋2(?⃗?)
=
𝑒𝑔1(?⃗?)
𝑒𝑔2(?⃗?)
 
=  
𝑒𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1+⋯+ 𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖+1)+⋯+𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝
𝑒𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1+⋯+ 𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖)+⋯+𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝
 
=  
𝑒𝛽0𝑒𝛽1𝑥1 … 𝑒𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖+1) … 𝑒𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝
𝑒𝛽0𝑒𝛽1𝑥1 … 𝑒𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖 … 𝑒𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝
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=
𝑒𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖+1)
𝑒𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖
 
=
𝑒𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖+𝛽𝑖
𝑒𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖
 
=
𝑒𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑒𝛽𝑖
𝑒𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖
 
= 𝑒𝛽𝑖 . 
While a parameter in OLS regression reflects the change in the mean response 
variable due to an increase in one unit of the explanatory variable, the parameters in 
logistic regression represent the natural logarithm of the change to the odds ratio of the 
response. 
When building a logistic regression model, a stepwise strategy is often employed 
with the maximum p-value of entry into the model, pE, set to a value between 0.15 and 
0.20, although this may be relaxed to pE = 0.25 if the analyst desires to include a greater 
number of potential explanatory variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). The minimum 
p-value of removal from the model, pR, should be set slightly larger than pE, with typical 
values being pE = 0.15 and pR = 0.20. Terms in the model are assumed linear in the logit, 
an assumption tested using the Box-Tidwell transform, which tests for the significance of 
the coefficient 𝛽𝑖on the new term 𝑥𝑖 ln 𝑥𝑖 when it is added to the model. A significant 
coefficient (usually at the 𝛼 = 0.05 level) means there is nonlinearity in the logit (Hosmer 
and Lemeshow 1989). Likewise, interactions should be assessed among variables where 
different response rates are expected at different levels. 
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  To assess the model’s classification accuracy a confusion matrix (also called a 
classification table) can be used, which shows the counts of true positives, true negatives, 
false positives, and false negatives obtained for a specified probability cutoff, usually 
𝜋0 = 0.5. A more informative assessment is found by using a receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) curve (Agresti 2002). This curve plots the sensitivity of the model 
as a function of (1- specificity) for the range of 𝜋0. The higher the area under the curve, 
the better the model is at classification, with 0.5 indicating that a model classifies no 
better than random guessing (Agresti 2002). 
 
Artificial Neural Networks 
An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is an information processing system that can 
be used for classification or regression analysis (Steppe 1994) and (Bauer 2011). For 
classification networks, an input vector’s information is extracted by the network and 
processed in parallel by a number of “neurons” or nodes, which produce a classification 
output. The input vector is a collection of the values of all independent variables (known 
as “features” in the neural network) for a single instance. In the case of SUAS failure 
data, an input vector would consist of the values of all the features deemed important to 
the model for one flight. The model processes one input vector per flight and compares 
its classification of “Mishap” or “No Mishap” to the known flight outcome, which is 
supplied with the input vector. 
 A typical feedforward network takes the input vector’s values and processes them 
forward through the “hidden layer” of nodes to the output layer, which yields a 
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classification. It is called a “feedforward” network because the information travels 
forward and is never fed back to any previous nodes. A simple feedforward artificial 
neural network for classification with one hidden layer and two classifier nodes (which is 
the neural network structure used herein for SUAS failure analysis) is shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. Feedforward Neural Network structure with one hidden layer and two output 
nodes for classification. Based on a diagram from (Steppe 1994). 
 
 To process the data, each feature’s input value (the windspeed, number of total 
flights, or days since pilot’s last flight, for example) is first normalized by subtracting that 
feature’s mean and dividing by its standard deviation (Bauer 2011). This normalized 
input is multiplied by a unique numerical weight (𝑤𝑖𝑗1  in Figure 7) before it enters each 
hidden layer node (𝑥𝑛1 in Figure 7). Within each node in the hidden layer, the weighted 
inputs of all features are summed and then standardized to a 0 to 1 range using a 
squashing function, such as the sigmoidal activation function (Steppe 1994). The sigmoid 
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function takes an input and transforms it to a 0 to 1 range. For a given numerical input, 𝑥, 
it takes the form:  
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑥
. 
This is equivalent to the logistic distribution, only with x expressed as a negative 
exponent in the denominator rather than as a positive exponent in both the numerator and 
denominator: 
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑥
× �
𝑒𝑥
𝑒𝑥
� =
𝑒𝑥
𝑒𝑥 + 𝑒−𝑥+𝑥
=
𝑒𝑥
1 + 𝑒𝑥
. 
This function ensures that any numerical input is restricted to 0 to 1 output; hence it is 
referred to as a “squashing” function. 
After the weighted, summed values are squashed to the 0 to 1 range by the 
sigmoid function, each hidden layer node’s output is then fed forward to be multiplied by 
a numerical weight (with weights 𝑤𝑗𝑘2  from Figure 7). All of these squashed, weighted 
values from the hidden layer of nodes then become the inputs for the output layer of 
nodes. The output nodes sum these inputs and squash them exactly as the hidden layer 
nodes previously did. Each output node corresponds to a possible outcome. The node 
with the highest output value gives the input vector its group classification. For the SUAS 
data, the flight is classified in group 1 (“Mishap” or “Damage”) if output node 1 produces 
a value larger than output node 0. If output node 0 produces the larger of the two values, 
the flight is classified as group 0 (“No Mishap” or “No Damage”). To provide better 
insight into the neural network process, the inner workings of a hidden layer node (𝑥21) 
are depicted in Figure 8. Some possible features (SUAS flight variables which have been 
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normalized) are shown in the input layer for explanatory purposes, but do not necessarily 
reflect the significant features of the final model. 
 
 
Figure 8. A hidden layer node in a hypothetical feedforward network. 
 
 Artificial neural networks improve their performance by using learning 
algorithms. These algorithms allow the neural network to adjust its weights according to 
a known classification for the given input. The network is trained to minimize error 
between its output and the truth data provided by the user. The learning algorithm used 
here for the SUAS failure data is called backpropagation. This algorithm minimizes the 
mean squared mapping error by updating both levels of weights after each input vector is 
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fed through the network by performing a gradient search of the error surface (Bauer 
2011). Essentially, the network compares its numerical output with the actual “0” or “1” 
flight outcome. It then updates its weights to provide the most dramatic decrease in the 
squared difference between the network’s output and the actual output. After the input 
data associated with each flight is fed forward, the network “learns” the best adjustment 
of its weights to provide more accurate results.  
The network is “trained” with only a subset of the data (usually 60-70%) while 
the remaining data are partitioned for validation and testing. Backpropagation is used to 
adjust the network’s weights for the training subset of data only. The validation data are 
fed forward through the network to determine their mapping error. In general, the 
network is considered optimized when the validation data error is at a minimum. Since a 
neural network with enough nodes can map an arbitrarily complex surface, the validation 
data set is used to prevent overfitting.  Overfitting occurs when the network learns the 
training data so well that it no longer generalizes to other, similarly collected data (which 
is what the validation data represents). Once the network is optimized, the test data is 
used as an independent check of the overall classification accuracy of the network. 
 As with logistic regression, determining which input features are salient to the 
model is important for parsimony and interpretation. Two primary saliency measures 
have been proposed for neural network features: weight-based saliency measures and 
derivative-based saliency measures (Bauer 2011). Weight-based measures take the sum 
of the squares of the lower-level of weights (𝑤𝑖,𝑗1  in Figure 7) for a given feature under 
the assumption that the more salient features have weights significantly greater or less 
than 0 whereas less salient features will tend to have weights of a smaller magnitude 
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(Tarr 1991). Derivative-based saliency measures compute partial derivatives of the 
network’s output with respect to feature inputs to determine a saliency measure (Bauer 
2011). In both cases, the saliency of a candidate feature (considered for removal from the 
model) can be compared to an injected noise feature, which is usually a uniform random 
variate from 0 to 1 (Bauer 2011). If the candidate feature differs in a statistically 
significant manner from the noise, it can be considered salient to the model. 
 The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) saliency measure proposed by Bauer, Alsing and 
Greene (2000) is used for SUAS failure modeling. This measure is weight-based and uses 
the injected noise input as a comparison for all candidate features. The saliency measure 
is computed by taking the ratio of the sum of squares of the weights for the candidate 
feature i and the injected noise n and converting to a decibel scale (Bauer, Alsing and 
Greene 2000): 
𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑖 = 10 log𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒10
∑ �𝑤𝑖,𝑗1 �
2𝐽
𝑗=1
∑ �𝑤𝑛,𝑗1 �
2𝐽
𝑗=1
. 
 Neural networks are randomly initialized, a fact which can often produce different 
results for the same inputs. To account for this randomness, the SNR saliency measure is 
computed for each feature for some number of neural networks (usually between N = 10 
and N = 30). The measure can be used to rank order the features, after which the least 
significant feature (lowest ranked) is removed and the average classification accuracy of 
the retrained networks is computed (Bauer, Alsing and Greene 2000). When there is a 
significant drop-off in the classification accuracy after a feature is removed, the last 
feature removed is retained in the network. When there is not a clear drop off, the analyst 
or decision maker uses their discretion to determine the cut-off point at which the 
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classification accuracy is acceptable. The remaining features are considered significant in 
the model. As with logistic regression, confusion matrices and ROC curves are used to 
assess the classification performance of the networks. 
 
Summary of Literature Review 
 The risks to SUAS are numerous. Prior experience suggests that if SUAS are 
comparable to their larger unmanned counterparts, they are at greatest risk of a failure 
from human error. Factors expected to reduce this risk are pilot experience, pilot 
currency, and any prior, manned flight experience. Since only one of AFRL/RWWV’s 
SUAS pilots held an FAA-certified pilot’s license, and he flew for 8 flights (less than 1% 
of total flights), only pilot experience and currency are investigated in this thesis. 
Currency is measured as days since a pilot’s last flight. 
 The next most likely source of risk is weather. Temperature is not expected to 
affect pilot performance, whereas wind speed has great potential to contribute to SUAS 
failures. Both ambient temperature and surface wind speeds are investigated for their 
contributions to SUAS failures, as well as experience at given flight locations, which may 
exhibit unique local weather patterns. 
 The generic catchall factor of organizational experience suggests that failure rates 
will decrease with greater experience. Total organizational number of flights are 
investigated as a factor for its impact on failure rates. Additionally, the number of flights 
on specific air frame types (“BATCAM” or “GENMAV”, for example) are investigated 
to determine if failure rates decrease with specific platform experience. Number of flights 
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on a given tail number (“BATCAM #12” or “GENMAV #3”, for example) are also 
investigated to determine its relationship to failure rates. 
 Although not mentioned in any research above, interval values are investigated to 
determine if the time between flights (for air frame, tail number, autopilot type, mission, 
pilot and location) affects the failure rate. Lastly, since research indicated that different 
types of aircraft experienced unique failure modes and rates, the data are analyzed while 
controlling for type of SUAS, whether an AFRL-designed prototype, or a COTS air 
frame. Likewise, the data are controlled for whether or not the SUAS was flown 
manually or assisted by autopilot, as these different modes of flight are likely to affect 
failure rates and types. These control factors are included when they are found to be 
statistically significant to the model, and are disregarded if they are not. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
 
Overview of Dataset and Modeling Approach 
 The dataset used for this thesis was derived from all available flight test reports (n 
= 854) from AFRL/RWWV over the years 2005-2009. The dataset consists of 20 
explanatory variables and three outcome variables whose values were extracted from the 
text or context of the flight reports (see Table 1). Not every flight has complete data: for 
example, some are missing wind speeds and temperatures while others (particularly those 
not flown on the Eglin range) are missing flight failure or damage outcomes. Every flight 
was entered into the database so that interval values could be determined (for example, if 
there is no data for failure or damage for tail number 12 when it last flew, the number of 
days between flights is still recorded on its next flight and its total number of flights is 
incremented). 
When dealing with missing data values, there are a few remedies that may be 
adopted. If the data that are missing meet certain randomness and ignorability 
assumptions, there are maximum likelihood estimation and imputation techniques that 
can maximize the available data by replacing these missing values while minimizing any 
bias introduced (Allison 2009). The technique adopted here is listwise deletion, in which 
a flight is deleted from the model if it is missing a value in a variable considered 
important to that model. This technique discards much data, but is “honest” in that it 
usually results in large but accurate standard error estimates, which some other 
techniques may artificially lower (Allison 2009). 
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Table 1. Code listing for all variables. 
Code Description n Min Max Mean 
DSAFLF Days Since Air Frame Last Flew 825 0 911 8.28 
DSAPTLF Days Since Autopilot Type Last Flew 766 0 486 5.43 
DSLF Days Since Last Flight 853 0 36 2.08 
DSLM Days Since Last Mission 853 0 36 7.71 
DSLOCLF Days Since Location Last Used 796 0 729 8.37 
DSPLF Days Since Pilot Last Flew 787 0 484 7.22 
DSTNLF Days Since Tail Number Last Flew 668 0 308 11.6 
MAN (0 = Autopilot, 1 = Manual) 854 0 1 0.0842 
MAXWIND Maximum Forecast Wind (kts) 738 0 25 8.16 
MINWIND Minimum Forecast Wind (kts) 738 0 15 4.56 
NFAF Number of Flights on Air Frame 854 1 251 59.2 
NFAPT Number of Flights on Autopilot Type 772 1 447 146 
NFLOC Number of Flights at Location 805 1 564 206 
NFP Number of Flights by Pilot 805 1 481 162 
NFTN Number of Flights on Tail Number 771 1 42 10.2 
NFTOT Number of Flights Total 854 1 854 428 
PROT (0 = COTS Aircraft, 1 = Prototype) 854 0 1 0.712 
TEMP Forecast Ambient Temperature (F) 751 25 95 71.9 
TIME 
Time of Day Mission Started  
(ex: 0800 = 8.0, 1545 = 15.75) 704 4.5 22 9.96 
WINDDIFF (MAXWIND - MINWIND) 738 0 20 3.60 
DAMAGE (0 = No SUAS Damage, 1 = Damage) 751* 0 1 0.233 
FAILURE (0 = No Failure, 1 = Failure) 754** 0 1 0.385 
FAILURE3 
(0 = Human Error, 1 = Mechanical 
Error, 2 = No Failure) 754** 0 2 1.42 
* There are n = 542 flights with complete records and DAMAGE outcomes 
 **There are n = 540 flights with complete records and FAILURE outcomes 
 
 
 
A series of logistic regression models were constructed to assess the significance 
of measured variables on different outcomes associated with SUAS failures. All models 
were built with JMP 9.0 software using a forward stepwise algorithm with pE = 0.15 and 
pR = 0.20.  
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Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model 
For the Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model, the response variable under 
consideration is FAILURE (0 = no failure, 1 = failure). The parameter estimates for the 
resulting model (n = 672, with prior probabilities Pr{FAILURE = 0} = 0.64 and  
Pr{FAILURE = 1} = 0.36) are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Parameter estimates and significance for the Logistic Regression Failure 
Prediction Model 
Term Estimate 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% Std Error 
Chi 
Square 
Prob> 
ChiSq 
Intercept -2.67096 -3.76805 -1.57386 0.55974 6.181 0.013 
PROT 1.81659 1.29893 2.33425 0.26411 47.309 0.000 
MAN 0.74216 0.03315 1.45117 0.36174 4.209 0.040 
NFTOT -0.00101 -0.00187 -0.00015 0.00044 5.297 0.021 
NFAF -0.00533 -0.00854 -0.00212 0.00164 10.597 0.001 
NFTN 0.03781 0.01698 0.05863 0.01063 12.661 0.000 
TEMP 0.01379 0.00084 0.02675 0.00661 4.353 0.037 
 
 
 
The corresponding odds ratios for a one unit increase in each explanatory variable are 
given in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3. Odds ratios for a one-unit increase for variables in the Logistic Regression 
Failure Prediction Model 
Term 
Odds 
Ratio 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
PROT 6.15083 3.66538 10.32161 
MAN 2.10047 1.03370 4.26815 
NFTOT 0.99899 0.99813 0.99985 
NFAF 0.99468 0.99150 0.99788 
NFTN 1.03853 1.01713 1.06039 
TEMP 1.01389 1.00084 1.02711 
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 The model’s variables did not exhibit significant nonlinearity in the logit with 
Box-Tidwell terms incorporated in the model, nor were any significant interactions 
found. The ROC curve and confusion matrix are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10 
respectively. The area under the curve (AUC) is 0.718, with a 69.6% hit rate for 
classification.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. ROC Curve for Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model. AUC = 0.718. 
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Figure 10. Confusion Matrix for Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model.  
Hit Rate = 69.6%. 
 
 
 
Logistic Regression Damage Prediction Model 
For the Logistic Regression Damage Prediction Model, the response variable 
under consideration is DAMAGE (0 = no SUAS damage, 1 = damage to SUAS). The 
initial model (n = 678, with prior probabilities Pr{DAMAGE = 0} = 0.783 and  
Pr{DAMAGE = 1} = 0.217) exhibited nonlinearity in the logit due to the NFTN variable. 
The Box-Tidwell transform is left in the model to correct the nonlinearity. The parameter 
estimates and significance are shown in Table 4. The corresponding odds ratios for a one 
unit increase in each explanatory variable (except NFTN) are given in Table 5.  
 
 
Table 4. Parameter estimates and significance for the Logistic Regression Damage 
Prediction Model. 
Term Estimate Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Std 
Error 
Chi 
Square 
Prob> 
ChiSq 
Intercept -1.61308 -2.16840 -1.05776 0.28333 4.60760 0.032 
PROT 1.42970 0.90387 1.95553 0.26828 28.40087 0.000 
NFAF -0.00842 -0.01259 -0.00425 0.00213 15.66932 0.000 
MAN 0.58012 -0.13653 1.29677 0.36564 2.51739 0.113 
NFTN -0.18407 -0.35776 -0.01039 0.08862 4.31479 0.038 
NFTN*ln(NFTN) 0.05637 0.00902 0.10372 0.02416 5.44358 0.020 
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Table 5. Odds ratios for a one-unit increase for variables in the Logistic Regression 
Damage Prediction Model. 
Term Odds Ratio 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
PROT 4.17746 2.46914 7.06766 
NFAF 0.99161 0.98749 0.99576 
MAN 1.78625 0.87238 3.65748 
NFTN - - - 
NFTN*ln(NFTN) - - - 
 
 
 
The odds ratio for NFTN cannot be directly obtained by exponentiating its 
parameter because the Box-Tidwell transformed term, which is a function of NFTN, 
affects the model’s predicted probability. The odds ratio for NFTN is not constant, but is 
a function of its present value. The derivation of the odds ratio for a one-unit increases in 
NFTN is shown below. In general, the odds ratio can be expressed as: 
𝑂𝑅𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁 =
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁 + 1)
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁
 
=  
𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡+𝛽𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇+𝛽𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐹𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐹+𝛽𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑁+ 𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)+𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)
𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡+𝛽𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇+𝛽𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐹𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐹+𝛽𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑀𝐴𝑁+ 𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)+𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)
 
=  
𝑒𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)+𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)
𝑒  𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)+𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)
 
=  
𝑒𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁𝑒ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)
𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)
𝑒ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)
𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁
 
=
�𝑒𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁�(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁 + 1)�𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)�(𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁+1)
𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁∗ln (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁)𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑁
. 
 
 44   
No significant interactions were found. The AUC is 0.681, with a 78.3% hit rate 
for classification. The ROC curve and confusion matrix are shown in Figure 11 and 
Figure 12 respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. ROC Curve for Logistic Regression Damage Prediction Model. AUC = 0.681. 
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Figure 12. Confusion Matrix for Logistic Regression Damage Prediction Model. Hit 
Rate = 78.3%. 
 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
Se
ns
iti
vi
ty
 (T
ru
e 
Po
si
tiv
e)
 
1-Specificity (False Positive) 
 45   
Logistic Regression Human vs. Mechanical Error Model 
 The importance of human error as a failure cause was quantified by a model that 
recoded the dichotomous dependent variable FAILURE into a polytomous variable, 
FAILURE3, with three categories: 0 = Human Error-caused Failure, 1 = Mechanical-
caused Failure, and 2 = No Failure. Mechanical-caused failures encompassed events 
where natural elements, autopilot errors, loss of communications, or electrical shorts led 
to SUAS failures. Human Error-caused Failures included pilot error, ground control 
operator error, or maintenance error which led to SUAS failures. Failures resulting from 
design errors were included in the Human Error category, despite the fact that they often 
produced effects that appeared to belong in the Mechanical-caused category. 
 A logistic regression model was constructed to classify each flight in the data set 
into one of the three categories. The model (n = 651, with prior probabilities 
Pr{FAILURE3 = 0} = 0.183, Pr{FAILURE3 = 1} = 0.184, and Pr{FAILURE3 = 2} = 
0.633) has the parameter estimates shown in  
Table 6. 
 The ROC curves for the model (see Figure 13) have AUC0 = 0.700, AUC1 = 
0.750, and AUC2 = 0.730. The hit-rate on the confusion matrix (see Figure 14) is 64.8%. 
Nonlinearity was found in the logit, which was corrected with the addition of a Box-
Tidwell term on (DSPLF + 1). The 1 was added to every instance of DSPLF since it often 
has values of 0, which would otherwise send its natural logarithm to negative infinity. A 
significant interaction was found between NFTOT and MAN, but the inclusion of this 
term lowered the classification accuracy, so it was not retained in the model. 
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Table 6. Parameter estimates and significance for Human vs. Mechanical Error Model. 
 Term Estimate Std Error 
Chi 
Square 
Prob> 
ChiSq 
M
od
el
 fo
r H
um
an
 E
rr
or
 Intercept -4.68195 0.77784 16.49 0.000 PROT 1.82054 0.32554 31.27 0.000 
NFTOT 0.00027 0.00058 0.22 0.638 
MAN 1.22563 0.42476 8.33 0.004 
MINWIND 0.08636 0.02980 8.4 0.004 
NFTN 0.05039 0.01390 13.13 0.000 
NFAF -0.00602 0.00235 6.58 0.010 
DSPLF 0.08685 0.06932 1.57 0.210 
TEMP 0.01697 0.00870 3.81 0.051 
(DSPLF+1)*ln(DSPLF+1) -0.02314 0.01829 1.6 0.206 
M
od
el
 fo
r M
ec
ha
ni
ca
l E
rr
or
 Intercept -2.49574 0.76150 3.68 0.055 
PROT 1.83844 0.40826 20.28 0.000 
NFTOT -0.00256 0.00063 16.82 0.000 
MAN 0.23041 0.53824 0.18 0.669 
MINWIND -0.03502 0.03198 1.2 0.274 
NFTN 0.02523 0.01365 3.42 0.065 
NFAF -0.00444 0.00204 4.72 0.030 
DSPLF 0.08163 0.03075 7.05 0.008 
TEMP 0.00917 0.00855 1.15 0.284 
(DSPLF+1)*ln(DSPLF+1) -0.01366 0.00574 5.66 0.017 
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Table 7. Odds Ratios for the Human vs. Mechanical Error model 
 Term 
Odds 
Ratio 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
M
od
el
 fo
r H
um
an
 E
rr
or
 PROT 6.17522 3.26246 11.68842 
NFTOT 1.00027 0.99914 1.00140 
MAN 3.40630 1.48157 7.83154 
MINWIND 1.09019 1.02834 1.15576 
NFTN 1.05168 1.02341 1.08074 
NFAF 0.99400 0.98944 0.99858 
DSPLF - - - 
TEMP 1.01712 0.99993 1.03460 
(DSPLF+1)*ln(DSPLF+1) - - - 
M
od
el
 fo
r M
ec
ha
ni
ca
l E
rr
or
 PROT 6.28670 2.82427 13.99401 
NFTOT 0.99744 0.99622 0.99866 
MAN 1.25912 0.43844 3.61597 
MINWIND 0.96558 0.90691 1.02805 
NFTN 1.02555 0.99848 1.05334 
NFAF 0.99557 0.99160 0.99957 
DSPLF - - - 
TEMP 1.00921 0.99243 1.02626 
(DSPLF+1)*ln(DSPLF+1) - - - 
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Figure 13. ROC Curve for Human vs. Mechanical Error Model. 
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Figure 14. Confusion Matrix for Logistic Regression Human vs. Mechanical Error 
Model. Hit Rate = 64.8%. 
 
 
 
Artificial Neural Network Failure Prediction Model 
For the ANN Failure Prediction Model, the response variable under consideration 
is FAILURE (0 = no failure, 1 = failure). The ANN Failure Prediction Model is designed 
primarily to screen out nonsalient features, and its input data (n = 539, with prior 
   FAILURE3 
: Human 
: Mech 
: None 
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probabilities Pr{FAILURE = 0} = 0.62 and  Pr{FAILURE = 1} = 0.38) are a subset of 
the data used for the Logistic Regression Failure Prediction model. Since all variables are 
included in the baseline model and refinements are made to the model by sequentially 
removing variables, those variables with potentially problematic correlations were 
removed prior to architecture selection and model building. The correlation matrix for the 
input data was computed, resulting in the significant correlations shown in Table 8.  
 
Table 8. Significant correlations for ANN input. 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Correlation 
NFTOT NFAPT 0.833 
DSTNLF DSAFLF 0.702 
MINWIND MAXWIND 0.689 
 
 
 
 For interpretation reasons, NFAPT was removed from consideration. It is easier to 
track and interpret NFTOT than NFAPT. Likewise, MINWIND was removed from 
consideration. Its value to a decision maker is less than that of MAXWIND, as most 
regulations and safety requirements decree a maximum wind level at which an SUAS is 
allowed to operate. DSTNLF and DSAFLF are not expected to be significant in the 
model (based on the results of the logistic regression analysis) and are left in. 
 The input data was appended with a noise feature generated as a Uniform(0,1) 
random variate. The data was then randomized and partitioned into training, validation 
and test sets (70%, 15%, and 15%, respectively). Ninety feedforward ANNs with one 
hidden layer, 100 epochs maximum, and backpropagation training were constructed in 
MATLAB for each number of hidden layer nodes considered for the architecture. The 
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average test set misclassification rate was plotted as a function of the number of hidden 
nodes (see Figure 15) to determine a best network architecture. Based on the results of 
this analysis, a network with 18 hidden nodes was selected, as this provides the minimum 
number of nodes before the misclassification rate begins increasing. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Test set misclassification rate as a function of number of hidden nodes for the 
ANN Failure Prediction Model (95% confidence interval). 
 
 
 Features were removed sequentially according to the SNR saliency criteria. Fifty 
feedforward neural networks each with one hidden layer and 18 nodes were trained to a 
maximum of 100 epochs, with backpropagation. The SNR saliency of each feature was 
computed after each network was trained and the least salient feature was denoted. The 
feature that received the most “least salient” rankings out of the 50 runs was removed. 
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Table 9. Feature order of removal for the ANN Failure Prediction Model. 
Total Number of 
Features Removed 
Feature Selected 
for Removal 
0 DSLOCLF 
1 DSPLF 
2 DSAFLF 
3 DSAPTLF 
4 DSTNLF 
5 TIME 
6 DSLF 
7 DSLM 
8 TEMP 
9 MAXWIND 
10 MAN 
11 NFTN 
12 NFP 
13 NFAF 
14 NFTOT 
15 NFLOC 
16 PROT 
17 NOISE 
 
 
 
 The test set misclassification rate was plotted against the number of removed 
features for each of the 50 neural networks to determine the optimal number of features 
to retain in the model (see Figure 16). The plot shows the misclassification rate 
decreasing until 9 to 11 features are removed, after which the misclassification rate 
dramatically increases.  
The three models, for 9, 10, and 11 features removed were compared against one 
another, with the noise variable removed from the input. One hundred neural network 
models were created using the same settings as before. The results are shown in Table 10. 
While a parsimonious model is desirable, so is an accurate model. The network that 
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removed 10 features appears to perform best, with the lowest minimum, lowest average, 
and only 7 features retained in the model. The variable MAN was retained in this model 
(but would not be retained in “model 11”), which made it attractive because MAN was 
declared earlier to be a potentially important control variable to include whenever 
possible. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Test set misclassification rate as a function of features removed for the ANN 
Failure Prediction Model (95% confidence interval). 
 
 
 
The architecture for the 7-feature model (containing features MAN, NFTN, NFP, 
NFAF, NFTOT, NFLOC, and PROT) was constructed and 100 networks using this 
structure were randomly initialized and simulated. From these resulting possibilities, the 
network model with the lowest observed test set misclassification rate was selected. This 
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model is the final ANN model selected for Failure Prediction. Its ROC curve and 
confusion matrix are shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18, respectively. The AUC is 0.724, 
with a 69.8% hit rate for classification.  
 
 Table 10. Comparison of three candidate ANN Failure Prediction models with 9, 
10, and 11 features removed, results for 100 networks. 
Features Removed 9 10 11 
Average Test Set 
Misclassification Rate 0.300 0.297 0.305 
Upper 95% Rate 0.307 0.304 0.312 
Lower 95% Rate 0.293 0.291 0.299 
Minimum Rate 0.238 0.225 0.225 
Maximum Rate 0.500 0.375 0.388 
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Figure 17. ROC Curve for ANN Failure Prediction Model. AUC = 0.724. 
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Figure 18. Confusion Matrix for ANN Failure Prediction Model. Hit Rate = 69.8%. 
 
 
 
Artificial Neural Network Damage Prediction Model 
 For the ANN Damage Prediction Model, the response variable under 
consideration is DAMAGE (0 = no SUAS damage, 1 = damage to SUAS). The input data 
(n = 539, with prior probabilities Pr{DAMAGE = 0} = 0.803 and  Pr{DAMAGE = 1} = 
0.197) was preprocessed the same way as it was for the ANN Failure Prediction Model. 
The architecture selection process was identically performed but was considerably more 
difficult as there was no clear “best” choice from the plot of test set misclassification rate 
versus number of hidden nodes (See Figure 19). The 20-hidden node structure was 
selected, as it appeared to have a low average misclassification rate and would maintain 
approximately the same structure as the previous model. 
Features were removed sequentially according to the SNR saliency criteria. Fifty 
feedforward neural networks each with one hidden layer and 20 nodes were trained in 
MATLAB to a maximum of 100 epochs, with backpropagation. The SNR saliency of 
each feature was computed after each network was trained and the least salient feature 
was denoted. The feature that received the most “least salient” rankings out of the 50 runs 
was removed. Features were removed in the order given in Table 11. 
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Figure 19. Test set misclassification rate as a function of number of hidden nodes for the 
ANN Damage Prediction Model (95% confidence interval). 
 
 
The test set misclassification rate was plotted against the number of removed 
features for each of the 50 neural networks to determine the optimal number of features 
to retain in the model (see Figure 20). The plot shows the misclassification rate 
fluctuating until 11 to 13 features are removed, after which the misclassification rate 
dramatically increases, then decreases. 
The three models, for 11, 12, and 13 features removed were compared against one 
another, with the noise variable removed from the input. One hundred neural network 
models were created using the same settings as before. The results are shown in Table 12. 
While a parsimonious model is desirable, so is an accurate model. The network that 
removed 12 features appears to perform best, with the lowest minimum rate, lowest 
average rate, and only 5 features retained in the model. 
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Table 11. Feature order of removal for the ANN Damage Prediction Model. 
Total Number of 
Features Removed 
Feature Selected 
for Removal 
0 DSPLF 
1 DSAFLF 
2 DSAPTLF 
3 DSTNLF 
4 DSLOCLF 
5 TIME 
6 DSLM 
7 DSLF 
8 TEMP 
9 MAN 
10 NFTN 
11 MAXWIND 
12 NFP 
13 NFTOT 
14 NFAF 
15 NFLOC 
16 PROT 
17 NOISE 
 
 
  
Table 12. Comparison of three candidate ANN Damage Prediction models with 11, 12, 
and 13 features removed, results for 100 networks. 
Features Removed 11 12 13 
Average Test Set 
Misclassification Rate 0.163 0.160 0.162 
Upper 95% Rate 0.165 0.162 0.163 
Lower 95% Rate 0.162 0.159 0.161 
Minimum Rate 0.138 0.125 0.150 
Maximum Rate 0.175 0.175 0.188 
 
 
 
The 5-feature model (containing features NFP, NFTOT, NFAF, NFLOC, and 
PROT) was simulated an additional 100 times at which point a model was selected with 
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the lowest observed test set misclassification rate. This model is the final ANN model 
selected for Damage Prediction. Its ROC curve and confusion matrix are shown in Figure 
21 and Figure 22, respectively. The AUC is 0.742, with an 82.4% hit rate for 
classification.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Test set misclassification rate as a function of features removed for the ANN 
Damage Prediction Model (95% confidence interval). 
 
 
 
0.150
0.170
0.190
0.210
0.230
0.250
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Te
st
 S
et
 M
isc
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
R
at
e
Number of Features Removed
 58   
 
Figure 21. ROC Curve for ANN Damage Prediction Model. AUC = 0.742 
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Figure 22. Confusion Matrix for ANN Damage Prediction Model. Hit Rate = 82.4%. 
 
 
Artificial Neural Network Human vs. Mechanical Error Model 
 The same coding system from the Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model 
was used to reclassify the dichotomous variable FAILURE into a polytomous variable, 
FAILURE3 with classes: 0 = Human Error-caused Failure, 1 = Mechanical-caused 
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Failure, and 2 = No Failure. Mechanical-caused failures included natural elements, 
autopilot errors, loss of communications, or electrical shorts. Human Error-caused 
Failures included pilot error, ground control operator error, design error or maintenance 
error.  
 A neural network model was constructed to classify each flight in the data set into 
one of the three categories. The model (n = 539, with prior probabilities Pr{FAILURE3 = 
0} = 0.173, Pr{FAILURE3 = 1} = 0.204, and Pr{FAILURE3 = 2} = 0.623) was 
constructed in the same way (and with the same parameters) as the previous two neural 
network models. The architecture selection phase showed that 10 hidden layer nodes 
were optimal (see Figure 23). The feature screening phase suggested a closer look at the 
models with 10, 11 and 12 features screened (see Figure 24). The order of removed 
features is given in Table 13. 
The three models, for 10, 11, and 12 features removed were compared against one 
another, after the noise variable had been removed from the input. One hundred neural 
network models were created using the same settings as before. The results are shown in 
Table 14. While a parsimonious model is desirable, so is an accurate model. The network 
that removed 11 features appears to perform best, with the lowest minimum rate, lowest 
average rate, and only 6 features retained in the model.  
The 6-feature model (containing features NFTN, NFP, NFLOC, NFAF, NFTOT, 
and PROT) was simulated an additional 100 times at which point a model was selected 
with the lowest observed test set misclassification rate. This is the final ANN model 
selected for Human vs. Mechanical Error Prediction. Its ROC curves and confusion 
matrix are shown in Figure 25 and Figure 26, respectively. The ROC curves for the 
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model have AUC0 = 0.698, AUC1 = 0.751, and AUC2 = 0.769, and the hit rate on the 
confusion matrix is 67.2%. 
 
 
Figure 23. Test set misclassification rate as a function of number of hidden nodes for the 
ANN Human vs. Mechanical Error Model (95% confidence interval). 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Test set misclassification rate as a function of features removed for the ANN 
Human vs. Mechanical Error Model (95% confidence interval). 
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Table 13. Feature order of removal for the ANN Human vs. Mechanical Error Model 
Total Number of 
Features Removed 
Feature Selected 
for Removal 
0 DSLOCLF 
1 DSAPTLF 
2 DSAFLF 
3 DSTNLF 
4 DSPLF 
5 MAN 
6 TIME 
7 DSLM 
8 MAXWIND 
9 DSLF 
10 TEMP 
11 NFTN 
12 NFP 
13 NFLOC 
14 NFAF 
15 NFTOT 
16 PROT 
17 NOISE 
 
 
Table 14. Comparison of three candidate ANN Human vs. Mechanical Error Prediction 
models with 10, 11, and 12 features removed, results for 100 networks. 
Features Removed 10 11 12 
Average Test Set 
Misclassification Rate 0.426 0.413 0.422 
Upper 95% Rate 0.432 0.419 0.428 
Lower 95% Rate 0.419 0.408 0.416 
Minimum Rate 0.363 0.350 0.375 
Maximum Rate 0.588 0.525 0.538 
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Figure 25. ROC Curve for Human vs. Mechanical Error Model. 
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Figure 26. Confusion Matrix for Human vs. Mechanical Error Model. Hit Rate = 67.2%. 
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IV.  Results and Analysis 
 
 
 
Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model 
The Failure Prediction Model is comparatively simple to analyze because it has 
neither interactions nor Box-Tidwell terms. The odds ratios are simply the exponentiation 
of the estimated parameters. The largest odd ratio is for the variable PROT, which 
indicates that, with all other model variables held constant, the choice to fly a prototype 
SUAS over a COTS SUAS increases the odds of a failure by 6 times. Likewise, with all 
model variables held constant, the same flight performed manually by a pilot has twice 
the odds of a failure as does that same flight with an autopilot. 
 Interestingly, while the other four variables had low odds ratios (near 1.0) all were 
significant at 𝛼 = 0.05. The one-unit increase may not the best metric for TEMP, 
because temperature is usually estimated at 5-degree intervals on AFRL/RWWV’s flight 
reports. The five-unit increase odds ratio becomes 𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃+5 = 𝑒5∗0.01379 = 1.071, 
which means that there is a 7% increase in the odds of a failure for every 5-degree 
temperature rise. 
 Similarly, the odds ratio of NFTOT is better computed for values larger than 1, 
since one flight out of the 854 total makes very little difference. In a similar computation 
as was done for TEMP above, the odds ratios for NFTOT are shown for multiple 
increments in Table 15. It shows that, with all other variables held constant, 10 flights of 
additional organizational experience decreases the odds of a failure by 1%. An additional 
500 flights decreases those odds to about 60%. 
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Table 15. Odds ratio of NFTOT for multiple intervals 
Additional 
Total Flights Odds Ratio 
5 0.995 
10 0.990 
25 0.975 
50 0.951 
100 0.904 
250 0.777 
500 0.603 
 
 
 In the failure prediction model, the variables NFAF and NFTN worked in 
opposition to one another. It was hypothesized that an increase in experience on a given 
aircraft would lead to greater operator and maintainer competency which would 
subsequently reduce failure rates. The model supports this hypothesis for airframes, but 
not for specific tail numbers. The opposite signs on NFAF and NFTN mean that more 
flights on an airframe (a given aircraft type, like the BATCAM or GENMAV) equate to 
lower odds of a failure, but more flights on a tail number (a specific vehicle like 
“BATCAM #12” or “GENMAV #3”, for example) equate to higher odds of failure. This 
result is attributable to the fact that the vehicles are often flown to failure. While not all 
vehicles crash (and failures do not require damage to have occurred) a given tail number 
will fly until it is no longer needed for AFRL/RWWV’s research or until it has crashed 
irreparably.  In this dataset, a vehicle’s last flight is usually a failure, so it is unsurprising 
that increases in NFTN positively correlate with failures. Additionally, there may be a 
physical basis for this result, as older vehicles may be more prone to mechanical failure. 
As with NFTOT above, increases in NFAF are given in more realistic intervals in Table 
16. The results show that, all other values being equal, given the choice between two 
airframes, one should select the airframe with more flights to reduce the likelihood of 
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failure. An additional 10 flights lowers the odds of failure by about 5% and an additional 
100 flights lowers the odds ratio to about 59%. 
 
 
 
Table 16. Odds ratio of NFAF for multiple intervals 
Additional Flights 
on Airframe Odds Ratio 
5 0.974 
10 0.948 
25 0.875 
50 0.766 
100 0.587 
 
 
 
 The overall performance of the failure prediction model is acceptable, with an 
AUC of 0.718 and a 69.6% hit rate for classification. Both measures indicate that the 
model outperforms simple guessing, but not by much. A guess of “no failure” on every 
flight would result in a hit rate of 64%, and is equivalent to the point in the upper right of 
the ROC curve. By selecting a desired sensitivity, the corresponding specificity can be 
obtained for the model. If AFRL/RWWV desired 80% sensitivity, the corresponding 
specificity is about 50%. For 90% sensitivity, the specificity drops to about 37%. 
 Some sample calculations may serve to better illustrate the operation of this 
model. Consider three hypothetical flights, whose data are shown in Table 17. 
 
Table 17. Sample Calculation Data for Three Hypothetical Flights 
Flight # PROT MAN NFTOT NFAF NFTN TEMP 
1 0 0 250 50 15 72 
2 1 0 250 50 15 72 
3 1 0 500 50 15 72 
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Using the coefficient estimates from the model, we compute the logit for Flight #1as: 
𝑔1(?⃗?) = −2.67096 + 1.81659(0) + 0.74216(0) − 0.00101(250) − 0.00533(50)
+ 0.03781(15) + 0.01379(72) 
𝑔1(?⃗?) = −1.630. 
The odds of a failure for Flight #1 becomes: 
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1 = 𝑒𝑔1(?⃗?) = 𝑒−1.630 = 0.1960. 
Which makes the probability of a failure: 
𝜋1 =
𝑒𝑔1(?⃗?)
1 + 𝑒𝑔1(?⃗?)
=
0.1960
1 + 0.1960
= 0.164. 
The model predicts a 16.4% probability of a failure given the Flight #1 values for 
the independent variables. If the same flight on the same day were flown by a prototype 
aircraft (PROT = 1, and assuming identical NFAF and NFTN) the data for Flight #2 
would be used in the model. Following the same procedure shown above, the results 
would be: 
𝑔2(?⃗?) = 0.1867, 
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠2 = 1.205, 
𝜋2 = 0.547. 
The change from a COTS SUAS to a prototype SUAS increases the probability of 
a failure from 16.4% to 54.7%. If the model were left in its default state with a 
classification cutoff percentage of 50%, Flight #1 would be classified as a “No Failure” 
outcome and Flight #2 would be classified as a “Failure”. Note that the ratio of the odds 
for both flights is equivalent to the odds ratio for the variable PROT (the only variable 
that was altered) from Table 3, 
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𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇 =
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠2
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1
=
1.205
0.1960
= 6.15. 
 Now consider Flight #3, which is identical to Flight #2 except that AFRL has now 
completed 500 total flights. Perhaps Flight #2 was canceled and the hypothetical 
prototype SUAS was placed on the shelf while 250 flights were accumulated, after which 
the same flight test was attempted. The results from calculations on Flight #3 are as 
follows: 
𝑔3(?⃗?) = −0.066, 
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠3 = 0.936, 
𝜋3 = 0.484. 
 Flight #3 has a 48.4% probability of a failure, which would be classified as “No 
Failure”. The odds ratio between Flight #3 and Flight #2 is: 
𝑂𝑅𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑂𝑇+250 =
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠3
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠2
=
0.936
1.205
= 0.777. 
This is the same odds ratio that can be found in Table 15, which gave odds ratios for 
increases in NFTOT. Since the only difference between Flight #3 and Flight #2 was the 
250 flight increase in NFTOT, the odds ratios between these two flights matches the 
value for 250 in the table. 
 
Logistic Regression Damage Prediction Model 
The model’s significant terms and parameter estimates are comparable to those in 
the Failure Prediction Model except that TEMP and NFTOT were not found to be 
significant in the model when controlling for the other variables. The choice of a 
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prototype or COTS SUAS only affects the odds ratio by a factor of 4 rather than 6, and 
manual flight versus autopilot flight gives a multiple of 1.8 instead of 2. NFAF has the 
same relationship with damage as it did with failures: greater airframe experience led to 
lower odds on negative outcomes. See Table 18 for the odds ratio on NFAF at different 
intervals. The nonlinearity in NFTN meant that the odds ratio of NFTN varied, crossing 
above 1.0 at values over 10. Thus, NFTN behaved the same way as it did in the Failure 
Prediction Model for values greater than or equal to 10; more flights on a given tail 
number meant greater odds of a negative outcome. Interestingly, for less than 10 flights, 
the effect of each subsequent flight, up to flight number 10, was to decrease the risk of 
damage by lowering the odds ratio. Graphically, this is shown in Figure 27, where the 
odds ratio for one-unit increases in NFTN are plotted against NFTN’s current value. An 
odds ratio of 1 is dashed in for reference. 
The Damage Prediction Model performed poorly overall. Although the AUC was 
0.681, the classification hit rate was only 78.3%. This is the same as the percentage of 
“no damage” outcomes in the dataset. Out of 678 flights, the model only predicted 8 
“damage” flights, 4 of which were correctly classified. For 80% sensitivity, the model 
produces about 43% specificity. For 90% sensitivity, 30% specificity can be obtained. 
 
Table 18. Odds ratio of NFAF for multiple intervals 
Additional Flights 
on Airframe Odds Ratio 
5 0.959 
10 0.919 
25 0.810 
50 0.656 
100 0.431 
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Figure 27. Odds Ratio for a one-unit increase in NFTN as a function of the present value 
of NFTN. Plotted across the range of NFTN values. 
 
Logistic Regression Human vs. Mechanical Error Model 
 The Human vs. Mechanical Error Model is comparatively difficult to analyze as it 
not only contains a Box-Tidwell term, but it has a polytomous response variable with 
three levels. The whole model has two submodels, the first of which classifies between 
outcomes 0 (Human Error-caused Failure) and 2 (No Failure), and the second of which 
classifies between outcomes 1 (Mechanical Error-caused Failure) and 2 (No Failure). The 
classification function computes three probabilities, corresponding to outcomes 0, 1, and 
2, the highest of which is selected as the estimated outcome. 
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 To compute these probabilities, let 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠0 = 𝑒𝑔0(?⃗?) be the odds associated with 
the Human Error submodel for a given input vector, ?⃗?. Similarly, let 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1 = 𝑒𝑔1(?⃗?) be 
the odds associated with the Mechanical Error submodel for the same input vector, ?⃗?. The 
probabilities of each outcome are computed as: 
𝜋0 =  
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠0
1 + 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠0 + 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1
, 
𝜋1 =  
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1
1 + 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠0 + 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1
, 
𝜋2 =  
1
1 + 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠0 + 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1
. 
 The Human vs. Mechanical Error model shares some similarities with the Failure 
Prediction Model. The parameter estimates for PROT compare well across both models, 
and indicate that the odds of a failure increase by a factor of between 6.2 and 6.3 when a 
prototype aircraft is selected over a COTS aircraft (holding all other variables constant). 
Because a nearly identical odds ratio affects both Human Error and Mechanical failure 
types nearly equally, this indicates that prototype aircraft are equally prone to mechanical 
as well as human error faults. 
The choice of autonomous vs. manual flight (indicated by a 0 or 1, respectively in 
the MAN variable) was significant in the Human Error submodel (p-value = 0.0039) but 
was insignificant in the Mechanical Error submodel (p-value = 0.6686). Since the 
parameter estimate on MAN was 1.226 in the Human Error submodel, this meant that the 
odds of a Human Error-caused Failure increased by a factor of 3.41 when the SUAS was 
flown by a human rather than by the autopilot. Further, due to the insignificance of the 
MAN term in the Mechanical Error submodel, one cannot say with 95% confidence that 
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the choice between autonomous or manual flight affects the risk of a mechanical failure. 
This result accords well with theory and common sense. 
The variable MINWIND was significant in the model, but only in the Human 
Error submodel. The model indicated than for every 1 knot increase in the minimum 
measured wind speed, the odds of a Human Error-caused failure increased by a ratio of 
1.09. A five-knot increase would result in an odds ratio of 1.54, with all other variables 
held constant. Since MINWIND is not significant at 𝛼 = 0.05 on the Mechanical Error 
submodel, one cannot determine its effect on Mechanical-caused failures. This result is 
somewhat consistent with theory in that higher winds were expected to increase the risk 
of failures. It makes sense that higher winds could lead to more human error failures, 
especially in manual flight situations, but since environmental failures were lumped in 
with the mechanical category, it is at odds with theory that wind speed should be a poor 
predictor of mechanical failures as well. 
 The variables NFTN and NFAF worked as they did with the Failure Prediction 
Model. An increase in flights on a tail number is associated with an increased odds ratio 
of a failure. Meanwhile, an increase in flights on an airframe is associated with a 
decreased risk of failure. This was true in general for both submodels, (noting that NFTN 
was only significant to 𝛼 = 0.065 in the Mechanical Error submodel) and is a result of 
the fact that individual tail numbers are usually flown to failure and then eliminated from 
the flying population.  
The variable DSPLF was significant in the model, and required a Box-Tidwell 
transformation term to linearize the logit. It was not significant in the Human Error 
submodel, but was very significant (both p-values < 0.02) to the Mechanical Error 
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submodel. This meant that while the pilot’s currency (the number of days since the pilot 
had last flown) was important for classifying mishaps, it only impacted the classification 
when mechanical errors caused failures, and was not significant for human error failures. 
Since the model has two terms with DSPLF, it has a variable odds ratio dependent upon 
its current value, much like NFTN did in the Damage Prediction Model. The one-unit 
odds ratio has been computed for the Mechanical Error submodel, the only model for 
which DSPLF was significant and is shown in Figure 28. It shows that the odds ratio of a 
mechanical-caused failure is above 1 for low values of DSPLF, but decreases with 
successively larger values. This means that the more days a pilot has between flights (up 
to his 143rd day, which is the crossover with odds ratio = 1) the higher the risk of a 
mechanical-caused failure. Each missed day increases the risk of failure, but has less 
effect each successive day, until the 143rd day, after which each successive missed day 
lowers the risk of a mechanical failure. 
The model is a poor classifier. While two of the three ROC curves are better than 
the Failure Prediction Model and all three are better than the Damage Prediction Model 
(measured by AUC), the overall classification accuracy from the Confusion Matrix shows 
a model just barely better than guessing. With 63.3% of flights ending in no mishap, the 
model was only able to correctly classify 64.8% of flights. The model only predicted 78 
failures (when 239 had occurred) and, of those predicted, only 37 were correctly 
classified while 14 were classified as the wrong kind of failure. From the ROC curve, it 
can be seen that to achieve 80% sensitivity, only 42% specificity (for the lowest curve) is 
achieved. For 90% sensitivity, the model yields only 28% specificity. 
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Some sample calculations may serve to better illustrate the operation of this 
model. Consider three hypothetical flights, whose data are shown in Table 19. These are 
similar to the hypothetical flights from Table 17, except that the mean values of 
MINWIND and DSPLF are included in the independent variables, and the MAN variable 
is changed for the third flight rather than NFTOT. 
 
 
Figure 28. Odds Ratio for a one-unit increase in DSPLF as a function of the present 
value of DSPLF. Plotted for the 1 vs. 2 (Mechanical Error) Model for a three-week range. 
 
Table 19. Sample Calculation Data for Three Hypothetical Flights 
Flight # PROT NFTOT MAN MINWIND NFTN NFAF DSPLF TEMP 
1 0 250 0 5 15 50 7 72 
2 1 250 0 5 15 50 7 72 
3 1 250 1 5 15 50 7 72 
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Using the coefficient estimates from the model, we compute the logit in the 
Human Error submodel for Flight #1 as: 
𝑔01(?⃗?) = −4.68195 + 1.82054(0) + 0.00027(250) + 1.22563(0) + 0.08636(5)
+ 0.05039(15) − 0.00602(50) + 0.08685(7) + 0.01697(72)
− 0.02314(7 + 1)ln(7 + 1) 
𝑔01(?⃗?) = −2.282. 
The same is computed for the Mechanical Error submodel, yielding: 
𝑔11(?⃗?) = −2.151. 
The odds of a Human Error-caused failure for Flight #1 becomes: 
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠01 = 𝑒𝑔01(?⃗?) = 𝑒−2.282 = 0.102. 
The odds of a Mechanical Error-caused failure for Flight #1 becomes: 
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠11 = 𝑒𝑔11(?⃗?) = 𝑒−2.151 = 0.116. 
Which makes the probability of a Human Error-caused failure: 
𝜋01 =
𝑒𝑔01(?⃗?)
1 + 𝑒𝑔01(?⃗?) + 𝑒𝑔11(?⃗?)
=
0.102
1 + 0.102 + 0.116
= 0.084. 
For Mechanical Error-caused failures, the probability is: 
𝜋11 =
𝑒𝑔11(?⃗?)
1 + 𝑒𝑔01(?⃗?) + 𝑒𝑔11(?⃗?)
=
0.116
1 + 0.102 + 0.116
= 0.095. 
For the “No Failure” outcome, the probability is: 
𝜋21 =
1
1 + 𝑒𝑔01(?⃗?) + 𝑒𝑔11(?⃗?)
=
1
1 + 0.102 + 0.116
= 0.821. 
 The model selects the outcome with the highest probability (𝜋21 = 82.1%), and 
would classify this as a “No Failure” flight. If the same flight were flown by a prototype 
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SUAS instead of a COTS SUAS (as in Flight #2 from Table 19, assuming the same pilot 
and identical NFTN and NFAF on the aircraft), the results change as follows: 
𝑔02(?⃗?) = −0.462, 
𝑔12(?⃗?) = −0.313, 
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠02 = 0.630, 
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠12 = 0.731, 
𝜋02 =
0.630
1 + 0.630 + 0.731
= 0.267, 
𝜋12 =
0.731
1 + 0.630 + 0.731
= 0.310, 
𝜋22 =
1
1 + 0.630 + 0.731
= 0.423. 
 The classification remains the same, “No Failure”, with 𝜋21 = 42.3% as the 
highest of the three probabilities. If the same flight test with the same prototype aircraft 
was performed with a pilot flying manually rather than by autopilot (Flight #3 from Table 
19, where MAN = 1) the model calculations produce the following results: 
𝑔03(?⃗?) = 0.764, 
𝑔13(?⃗?) = −0.082, 
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠03 = 2.147, 
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠13 = 0.921, 
𝜋03 =
2.147
1 + 2.147 + 0.921
= 0.528, 
𝜋13 =
0.921
1 + 2.147 + 0.921
= 0.226, 
𝜋23 =
1
1 + 2.147 + 0.921
= 0.246. 
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 The classification category changes for Flight #3. Rather than “No Failure” like 
the previous two flights, the model selects “Human Error” as the most likely outcome for 
the flight. This accords with the interpretation of the coefficients and odds ratios provided 
above which indicated that prototype aircraft increase the risk of both types of failures, 
and that manual flight increases the risk of Human Error-caused failures. In the example 
case, the change to manual flight had a significant impact on the odds ratio to indicate a 
Human Error outcome. The change to manual flight will always have that impact on the 
odds ratios, but those odds ratios affect the classification outcomes differently, depending 
on the starting probabilities.  
 
Artificial Neural Network Models 
 The ANN models were used to screen features to determine which factors had the 
greatest impact on each of the SUAS outcomes. The three ANN models showed many 
similarities with each other and had much in common with the logistic regression models, 
but the differences between them can also be exploited to gain insight into SUAS failures 
and damage.  
The worst-performing ANN model was the model for Damage Prediction, which 
matches the results for logistic regression. The way the neural network model was formed 
gives additional insight into why both Damage models are barely better than guessing. 
When exploring a neural network’s potential architecture, one should see a decreasing 
misclassification rate as more nodes are added until the rate stabilizes, and any additional 
nodes fail to provide improved performance. This behavior is clearly seen in the ANN 
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Failure Prediction Model (see Figure 15). The ANN Damage Model (see Figure 19) does 
not display this behavior. This means that there is no optimal, minimal architecture, 
which is probably a result of having data that is indistinguishable from noise. This can be 
seen in the plot of misclassification rate as a function of features removed, which should 
look like a mirror image of the architecture exploration plot. The ANN Damage 
Prediction Model (see Figure 20) has a fluctuating mishap classification rate, which 
spikes when most features are removed and then rapidly decreases. Since the last data 
point shows the misclassification rate when a noise variable is the only input to the 
model, it suggests that the other data add little to the classification, because including 
them results in a higher misclassification rate. Thus, both Damage Prediction Models are 
difficult to correctly classify based on the noise-like quality of their input data, relative to 
the output. 
The ANN Human vs. Mechanical Error Model is better by comparison, exhibiting 
misclassification rate curves that are more typical of well-classifying neural networks. 
The model performed almost identically to the Logistic Regression Model, with ROC 
AUCs that nearly matched for both Human and Mechanical Error. This was an 
encouraging result and suggested that prediction of the specific types of error is possible. 
The confusion matrix clarifies that when Mechanical Error is predicted, the model only 
classifies it correctly 32
13+20+32
= 49.2% of the time. Interestingly, if the Human and 
Mechanical Error classifications are lumped together, this model has a higher hit rate than 
the Failure Prediction model, correctly predicting 22+13+10+32+308
539
= 71.4% of total 
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mishaps, regardless of cause. This outperforms the ANN Failure Prediction model, which 
only had a hit rate of 69.8%. 
The ANN Failure Prediction Model was the best-looking model from an 
architecture selection and feature-screening perspective. It displayed the expected 
characteristics of a good classifying network. Its performance was very similar to that of 
the Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model, with a nearly identical ROC curve and 
confusion matrix (when taking into account the different sample sizes). The features 
selected for the model compare favorably with those found by logistic regression, and 
nearly identically match those selected for the other ANN models. Table 20 presents the 
selected features for each model, ranked by order of significance (using p-value for 
logistic regression, and reverse order of removal for ANN). 
 
Table 20. Feature ranking for all models. (*Asterisk denotes a transformed feature) 
Failure Prediction Damage Prediction Failure: Human vs. Mech Error 
Log. Reg. ANN Log. Reg. ANN Log. Reg. ANN 
PROT PROT PROT PROT PROT PROT 
NFTN NFLOC NFAF NFLOC NFTOT NFTOT 
NFAF NFTOT NFTN* NFAF NFTN NFAF 
NFTOT NFAF MAN NFTOT MINWIND NFLOC 
TEMP NFP   NFP DSPLF* NFP 
MAN NFTN     NFAF NFTN 
 
MAN     MAN 
         TEMP   
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Model Comparison  
There are some consistencies in the features selected by all models. Most 
important, the variable PROT was the most significant to each model, for predicting both 
failure and damage. Clearly the single greatest indicator of flight outcome is whether the 
SUAS flown is a prototype model constructed by AFRL or a COTS model purchased 
from a manufacturer.  
NFAF is the only other variable to appear in every model. This means that 
AFRL’s experience with a given airframe is important to predicting flight outcomes. 
Likewise, NFTN and NFTOT appear in five of the six models, which suggests that they 
are significant factors to investigate for failure prevention. MAN was the next most 
important factor, appearing in four models, and is likewise worth noting for further 
analysis and investigation. 
The preponderance of factors that begin with “NF” (and the corresponding dearth 
of terms beginning with “DS”) indicates the importance of experience over intervals in 
determining SUAS flight outcomes. The “NF” factors record the total number of flights 
for each measure, which is a good approximation for overall experience (NFTOT for 
organizational experience, NFP for individual pilot experience and so forth). The “DS” 
factors record the days since an event occurred, which marks the intervals between 
events. These “DS” terms, with one exception, are surprisingly absent from this ranking.  
The poor performance of the Damage Prediction Model (for both Logistic 
Regression and Artificial Neural Networks) casts suspicion on the important factors it 
suggests. If those two damage models are excluded from consideration, the remaining 
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models for Failure Prediction suggest PROT, NFAF, NFTN, NFTOT, and MAN as the 
most significant factors to address. Interestingly, some factors were favored by the 
different model-building tools, with Logistic Regression using TEMP exclusively and 
Artificial Neural Networks using NFLOC exclusively in both Failure models. These 
variables may also warrant consideration, but are less likely to be of practical importance, 
both from a physical perspective and from a modeling perspective. 
 
Model Validation 
 The best-performing model, the Logistic Regression Failure Prediction Model, is 
investigated for validity using 50 flights from the first quarter of calendar year 2010. 
These data were not used in the construction of the model. Of the 50 flights, only 41 have 
complete input data and failure outcomes. There were 5 flights terminating in failures 
over this time period (12.2% failure rate), with three occurring on the same day, while 
trying to accomplish the same highly complex, high-risk (in the opinion of the test 
engineer) flight objective. 
 The model predicts 0 individual flight failures over the same period. See the 
Confusion Matrix in Figure 29. NFTOT has a large influence at approximately 900 
flights, producing an odds ratio of 𝒆−.𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟎𝟏∗𝟗𝟎𝟎 = 𝟎.𝟒𝟎𝟐. The most likely type of flights 
that can cause the model to predict failures at this high level of NFTOT are those with 
prototype SUAS being flown manually. No flights with these characteristics were 
attempted during this period. In order for the model to predict a failure for a COTS 
aircraft, the SUAS has to be flown manually and must have an NFTN in excess of 57. 
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This is unrealistic as Table 1 shows that the highest NFTN for the main dataset is 42. 
Thus, the model will probably not predict failures for COTS aircraft with a large NFTOT. 
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Figure 29. Confusion Matrix for Validation of Logistic Regression Failure Prediction 
Model. Hit Rate = 87.8%. 
 
 
Over this period, 83.0% of flights were COTS SUAS, compared to the 28.8% 
historical average and 57.2% for the same quarter of the previous calendar year. This 
indicates that the validation dataset does not reflect the typical composition of the 
historical data, but indicates a trend away from testing prototype aircraft.  
Of interesting note, the two failures not associated with the high-risk flight test 
both occurred to COTS SUAS while under manual control. In both cases, the failure 
prediction probability was elevated due to flying under manual control. In one case, the 
particular SUAS had a large number of prior flights (NFTN = 38), which additionally 
raised its predicted probability of a failure. This reinforces the validity of MAN as a 
critical factor to be addressed for failure prevention, and suggests that NFTN may 
likewise be important. 
 Further, the model predicts the probability of failure for each of the 41 flights. 
Over the flights examined, the minimum probability of failure is 5.1%, the maximum is 
41.5% and the median and mean are 10.2% and 13.7%, respectively. The model does not 
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predict that any specific flights will be failures (no individual probability is greater than 
50%). Since there are 41 flights where there are non-zero (and sometimes significant) 
probabilities of failure, this suggests that the test engineer can expect a certain number of 
flight failures. 
Assume that a decision maker or test engineer can specify these 41 flights in 
advance and wants to know the expected number of mishaps, given all the probabilities 
across all flights. The Poisson-Binomial distribution is examined, which gives the 
expected probability for a given number of failures occurring out of the 41 flights. In 
general, the Poisson-Binomial is the convolution of 𝑛 independent, non-identical 
Bernoulli trials (Wang 1993). Each flight represents a non-identical Bernoulli trial, 
because it is a single trial with a unique probability of failure (assessed by the failure 
prediction model). The outcome “failure” is substituted where the word “success” would 
normally appear in the description of a Bernoulli trial, because “failure” is the outcome 
that is positively predicted by the model. The Poisson-Binomial can be solved iteratively 
using equations from Chen, Dempster and Liu (1994): 
𝑅(𝑘,𝐶) =
1
𝑘
Σ𝑖=1𝑘 (−1)(𝑖+1)𝑇(𝑖,𝐶)𝑅(𝑘 − 𝑖,𝐶) 
where 
𝑅(𝑘,𝐶) is the probability of obtaining 𝑘 “failure” trials, 
𝑅(𝑘 − 𝑖,𝐶) is the probability (previously computed) of obtaining 𝑘 −  𝑖 “failure” trials,  
and 𝑇(𝑖,𝐶) is computed as shown: 
𝑇(𝑖,𝐶) = Σ𝑗=1𝑛 𝑤𝑗𝑖. 
𝑅(0,𝐶) = Π𝑗=1𝑛 (1 − 𝜋𝑗) is the probability associated with zero “failure” trails, 
 83   
𝑤𝑗 = �
𝜋𝑗
1−𝜋𝑗
� is the odds of a failure on flight j,  
and 𝜋𝑗 is the probability of “failure” on each flight 𝑗 out of 𝑛 total flights. 
This iterative equation was implemented in MATLAB to compute the expected 
number of failures for the 41 validation flights. The Poisson-Binomial distribution for 
these flights (see Figure 30) shows that five failures is the largest of all the binomial 
probabilities at 18.5%. Six failures and four failures are the next most likely, with 17.7% 
and 15.5% probabilities, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 30. Poisson-binomial distribution for total number of failures given 41 flights 
with individual flight probabilities determined by logistic regression failure model. 
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that five failures was the most likely outcome of the 41 flights, a result that is exactly 
validated by the dataset, in which five failures occurred. There is a wide range of 
statistical validity with such a small validation set, though. The bounds of a two-tailed 
90% confidence level include outcomes from three to nine failures, and the bounds of a 
two-tailed 97% confidence level include outcomes from two to ten failures. Assuming a 
97% confidence level, if the 41 flights result in two to ten total failures (inclusive), it will 
not be rejected as statistically different from the Poisson-Binomial model. Since there 
were five failures observed over these 41 flights, it can be concluded from these results 
that there is not enough statistical evidence to reject the validity of this model for 
predicting the expected total number of failures. 
 
Model for Flight Planning 
 Using the results of the logistic regression modeling, a basic flight planning 
model can be constructed that provides decision makers with an estimated minimum 
number of flights to meet a given probability of success. The test engineers outline their 
objectives, select the SUAS platform to complete it, select a pilot to fly the mission, and 
collect all the necessary data as input for the logistic regression failure model. The output 
from this model provides an estimate of the probability of a failure for the given set of 
inputs. Assuming that failures result in complete data loss, this probability can be used to 
compute the minimum expected number of flights necessary to reach a given probability 
of overall mission success. 
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 Since the same platform, test site, flight crew, and other associated variables will 
be used to achieve a specific flight objective on a given test day, the probability of an 
SUAS failure is assumed to be constant for that mission on that day. This is not entirely 
accurate, as each additional flight adds to NFTOT and NFAF (and NFTN if the same tail 
number is recycled). But these variables affect the odds ratio so slightly (and NFAF and 
NFTN work against one another) that the effect from flight to fight is small. In practice, 
the probabilities of failure of sequential flights with the same SUAS typically vary by less 
than 0.3% from flight-to-flight. Therefore, the output from the logistic regression failure 
model is a good approximation for the probability of failure across all flights on a given 
test day.  
 Let the failure probability, 𝜋, be the output of the logistic regression failure model 
and let the minimum probability of mission success, 𝑝, be determined by the decision 
maker or test authority. The minimum necessary number of flights flown, 𝑛, that are 
expected to meet this minimum success level is related to these probabilities as shown: 
1 − 𝜋𝑛 ≥ 𝑝. 
Given a minimum required probability of success and a probability of failure from the 
logistic regression model, the minimum expected number of flights can be computed as 
shown: 
𝑛 ≥
ln(1 − 𝑝)
ln(𝜋)
. 
This is equivalent to computing the number of trials necessary for the sum of all binomial 
probabilities greater than zero to exceed probability 𝑝 given 𝜋. 
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For example, assume that Flight #3 from Table 17 is specified by the test 
engineers. The logistic regression failure model predicts a probability of failure of 0.484 
or 48.4%. This flight would be classified as a “No Failure” flight, but it still has a fairly 
high chance of failure. If a minimum probability of success of 90% was desired, the 
minimum expected number of flights is: 
𝑛 ≥
ln(1 − 0.90)
ln(0.484)
, 
𝑛 ≥ 3.17, 
𝑛 = 4. 
This means that when the probability of each flight failing is 48.4%, the test 
engineer can expect that all mission objectives will be achieved (all necessary flight data 
collected) 90% of the time if at least four flights are attempted. If the minimum 
probability of success is raised to 95%, the minimum number of flights is five. 
Obviously, a 100% success rate is theoretically impossible. 
This model, while simplistic, provides a good rule of thumb for the test engineer 
to estimate the number of flights necessary to gather all the data. This model does suffer 
from a few shortcomings, though. As discussed, it assumes that the probabilities for each 
flight are constant, whereas they will vary slightly with the changes in NFTOT, NFAF, 
and NFTN on each successive flight. Further, a flight failure does not necessarily mean 
that all data is lost. If the failure occurs immediately upon takeoff, it is likely that all data 
for the test will be lost. If the failure occurs midway through, it is possible that some data 
could be salvaged, without having to be repeated by subsequent tests. To account for this, 
the test engineer may find that a minimum probability of success set closer to 80% or 
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lower works best, due to the partial gathering of data on each failure flight. Likewise, the 
complexity of the mission objectives may affect the estimated number of flights: a 
mission to see if a new launch capability performs correctly is a simple test whose result 
is known if the SUAS takes off, whereas a series of climbs and glides to assess engine 
and aerodynamic performance is more complex. The former may require a low 
probability of success in order for the model to reflect empirical results, whereas the 
latter may require a much higher probability. The occurrence of damage and its impact on 
this flight planning model is not addressed, but would also affect the number of flights, 
by possibly altering which aircraft could fly. If a damaged aircraft is replaced, the 
probability of a failure from the logistic regression failure model could change 
dramatically due to differences in NFAF (if a different model was selected for the 
mission) and NFTN (if a different tail number of the same model was selected). 
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V.  Discussion 
 
 
 
Summary 
 This research sought to determine if SUAS flight test failures and airframe 
damage could be predicted from parameters measured prior to flight. A failure was 
defined as a flight test terminating unexpectedly prior to all data being collected, 
regardless of the cause of the termination. Damage was defined as any injury to the 
airframe, regardless of cost or repair time. Both failures and damage were modeled with 
logistic regression to determine the quantifiable effects of each important parameter, and 
with artificial neural networks to provide an alternative method of parameter screening. 
A review of the literature on large SUAS and manned aircraft mishaps (which are 
comparable to a composite of SUAS “failures” and “damage”) suggested that human 
error would be a leading cause of SUAS failures, and that increased pilot experience and 
currency would help reduce those failure rates. In the course of analysis, human error was 
found to be equally as prevalent as mechanical error, while pilot experience and currency 
were not found to significantly affect failure rates. Likewise, surface wind speed was 
hypothesized to affect failure rates, but this parameter, too, was not found to significantly 
affect observed failure rates. The one area where large UAS and manned aircraft results 
overlapped with the SUAS results obtained in this research is in the effect of experience. 
Mishap rates tend to decrease in the manned and large UAS communities over time as 
more flight hours are built up and as organizations adapt. So, too, did SUAS failure rates  
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decrease, both with total number of flights across all platforms, as well as with total 
flights for each type of airframe. 
 The overall results of the logistic regression analysis were that damage could not 
be accurately predicted, but failures could be. The neural network analysis confirmed that 
the measured parameters modeled damage no better than random noise. For failure 
modeling, the five main parameters deemed important by the logistic regression and the 
artificial neural network modeling merited further investigation for failure prevention.  
The models developed from this data were not all equally useful. Most noticeably, 
the damage prediction models performed poorly as classifiers. This means that SUAS 
damage is not possible to predict with any greater accuracy than simple guessing, given 
the measured variables that were available. Damage appears to be a random outcome, 
with no discernible root causes. The primary conclusion regarding damage is that it 
occurs in about 23% of flights, with no clear preventive measures available. 
Discriminating between human-caused and mechanical-caused failures shows some 
promise, but the significant factors identified by the two modeling approaches were 
dissimilar and the prediction hit rates were weak. 
 The simple outcomes of “failure” and “no failure”, on the other hand, tend to be 
more predictable. There are common features that are correlated with the occurrence of 
SUAS failures that can be exploited to minimize future mishap rates. Two dichotomous 
variables, PROT (which indicated whether an SUAS was a lab-developed prototype or a 
Commercial-off-the-Shelf aircraft) and MAN (which indicated whether an SUAS was 
flown manually or with autopilot control) were significant in predicting failures. From 
the analysis, it can be concluded that, controlling for all other significant factors, flying a 
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prototype SUAS increases the odds of a failure by a factor of six over a COTS aircraft. 
Additionally, controlling for all other significant factors, flying an SUAS manually rather 
than by autopilot control increases the odds of a failure by a factor of two. The more 
flights the organization has in total, and the more flights on a given type of airframe, the 
lower the failure rate. More flights on a given tail number increases the risk of a failure. 
The results of this research were obtained from data gathered on small, unmanned 
aerial systems with wingspans between 20 inches and 11 feet and takeoff weights under 
100 pounds. Twenty nine unique airframes (with a total of 103 different tail numbers), 
including a mix of lab-designed prototypes and COTS models were aggregated for this 
analysis. All data were obtained in a research environment where prototype SUAS are 
frequently developed and more traditional, COTS SUAS are flown in new ways and with 
novel objectives, payloads, and technologies. Thus, the results of this research are 
applicable primarily to experimental vehicles and in a research and development 
environment. This is not to say that the lessons learned must not be applied to other 
systems or operational environments, but merely that one should exercise caution and be 
fully aware of the underlying assumptions of this research before applying its conclusions 
to other scenarios. 
 
Recommendations 
 The recommendations from these results are fairly straightforward. One simple 
way to decrease the odds of a failure is to substitute a COTS SUAS for a prototype SUAS 
whenever possible. This should be done especially when flying high value payloads or 
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mission-critical objectives. Alternately, (and much more complexly) the prototype 
aircraft could be brought up to COTS levels of reliability. However, given that AFRL is 
primarily tasked with pushing the technological boundaries and then transferring the 
technology to other organizations or private industry to be refined, this second option is 
outside the normal scope of operations and is almost certainly not cost effective. 
 The preference for autonomous flight over manual flight to reduce failure rates is 
not necessarily intuitive but makes sense in light of the remarkable differences in sensory 
environment that SUAS exhibit versus manned aircraft. The possibilities for perceptual 
errors have been well-established for large UAS. It appears that autonomous control of 
SUAS significantly reduces failures that would have otherwise occurred with manual 
flight. 
 Less significant, but still important is the role of experience in failure prevention. 
Greater organizational experience, expressed as the increase in total number of flights 
across all platforms, reduces failures. Greater organizational experience with a given type 
of airframe similarly reduces failure rates. These results were largely expected, but are 
nonspecific given the quality of the data. The term “experience” is not merely a measure 
of AFRL’s proficiency with the mechanics of SUAS flight tests and knowledge of the 
peculiarities specific to each airframe. Rather, this broad term incorporates all 
organizational knowledge and improvements made to SUAS operations and airframes 
without identifying the specific improvements that reduced the failure rates. AFRL 
continually adds additional features to its flight planning and operations and iterates on 
SUAS designs to great overall effect. The result has been a statistically significant 
decrease in failure rates over time, which can be captured in this concept of 
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organizational experience. However, the specific improvements that have had greatest 
effect (or those hypothesized improvements which have actually worsened failure rates) 
cannot be determined with precision from the data. Thus, while increased organizational 
experience with flight testing and on each airframe is likely to continue to lower failure 
rates, the efficacy of specific actions and policy decisions have not been assessed in the 
research, except to the extent that they influence other variables. 
 One such case of this influence is with pilot currency. While AFRL was not 
required to meet mandatory pilot currency requirements for the period covered by this 
data, future regulations will incorporate requirements mandating that SUAS pilots have a 
minimum number of flights over a set time period, in order to remain “current”. The 
results of this research indicate that pilot currency is not statistically significant in the 
model of SUAS failures. Coupled with the results on the benefits of autonomous flight 
over manual flight, it appears that resources would be best spent to ensure that the 
autopilot settings are correct rather than that pilots have recently flown. The elimination 
of a pilot currency requirement, while not impacting failure rates, would also save 
valuable range testing time that can be used for higher priority flight experiments. 
 Many recent AFRL flight experiment test plans have imposed maximum surface 
wind requirements (which were not in place while this data was being collected) that can 
cause test delays or cancellations. This research demonstrated that the maximum surface 
winds at the test site were statistically insignificant in the model of SUAS failures. 
Likewise, other environmental factors such as time of day, temperature, and location had 
no statistical impact on failure rates. Thus, there is not enough evidence to conclude that 
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any of these measured environmental factors impact SUAS failure rates either positively 
or negatively.  
Flight failures have historically occurred in 38.5% of all AFRL/RWWV SUAS 
flight experiments. An understanding of this failure rate may help decision makers, range 
safety officers and test engineers with expectation management. While this research has 
outlined some positive steps AFRL can take to lower mishap rates, it has also identified 
areas that show little promise at improving the rates in the hopes that preventive measures 
are only undertaken which are statistically justifiable and whose benefits are 
appropriately balanced with costs. There are a few additional measures that can be taken 
that may assist future analysts and engineers identify means to further lower SUAS 
failure rates. 
 Root causes of failures should be analyzed from an engineering perspective and 
tracked to identify trends. This could be as simple as one or two lines added to every 
flight report and one or more categories assigned to the outcome of each flight in a 
database, much like the error codes of the DoD HFACS taxonomy. This simple addition 
will enable a future analyst to quickly identify failure or damage trends without resorting 
to guesswork or memory to recall the root causes. Additionally, if any other factors that 
were not included in this research are deemed important for possible failure prediction 
and prevention (such as percent of maximum takeoff weight used, ground station 
operator experience, or mission type as a categorical variable), they should be recorded in 
the flight reports. 
Tracking each tail number individually would help to identify trends in aircraft 
disposal for reliability estimates. Each tail number was not tracked precisely over the five 
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years covered by this data set. We do not know with certainty from the data where each 
tail number went: whether it was scrapped when a program ended, disposed of following 
a crash, upgraded into a newer airframe model, demolished in destructive lab testing, or 
sent away to be a desk model or display aircraft. By tracking the outcomes of flight 
testing on each airframe, reliability estimates may be made that can shed light on how 
many flights an airframe can be expected to have before being disposed, or what the 
mean time between failures is for a tail number. 
Lastly, organizational experience has a positive impact on failure rates, but there 
were insufficient data to determine with specificity which changes were beneficial and 
which were detrimental. Over the period measured, the net result was improvement in 
failure rates, but there is no way to identify and quantify the most cost-effective 
improvements. A record of policy decisions, major design alterations, or major process 
changes should be noted on flight reports to provide a time stamp for future analysis. This 
future analysis should seek to determine whether the policy, design, or process changes 
have been effective in lowering failure rates, predicting damage rates, or generally 
improving the cost-effectiveness of operations.  
 
Areas for Future Research 
 Ordinarily, a designed experiment is recommended to better screen important 
features and to optimize SUAS failure rates. Unfortunately, no designed experiment is 
possible in this case. This is due to the unique nature of the data; only a handful of 
parameters can be adjusted to specific factor levels, while most cannot. The surface wind 
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speed can be measured but not controlled. Test times, days and locations are typically 
awarded on a priority-based system, with no guarantees of dates, times or locations. 
Number of total flights can never be lowered, and can only be raised incrementally. The 
same is true of the other counting variables. Each airframe has a given number of flights 
in its history and can only gain them at the cost of adding an additional airframe flight, an 
additional organizational flight, and an additional pilot flight, while at the same time 
resetting all the days since last flight, days since last mission, days since pilot’s last flight 
and similar interval measures. While techniques like analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
could be used to account for the influence of uncontrollable factors, the interconnected 
nature of the flights precludes a randomized, designed experiment on the full complement 
of parameters. 
 Any effects of selection bias should be investigated. The results of this research 
describe significant correlations that were found in the data, but these correlations do not 
necessarily imply causation. For example, the logistic regression failure model found that 
as the number of flights on a tail number increases, its odds of a failure increase. This 
does not necessarily mean that tail numbers should be scrapped after a few flights to 
lower their risk of failure. It could mean that older aircraft are intentionally selected for 
riskier flight experiments – nothing in the data is able to identify if that hypothesized 
action is occurring. Likewise, the fact that wind speed did not affect failure rates should 
not be read as an encouragement to fly in adverse weather conditions. It could be that 
only missions with higher-likelihoods of success (as determined by the test engineer) 
were selected for known windy days, or that other tests were intentionally scrapped 
despite the lack of maximum wind regulations at the time. These examples highlight how 
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selection bias could influence the results and should be investigated to better characterize 
the effectiveness of potential interventions. 
 
Contributions of this Research 
• The first published study of SUAS failure and damage rates, this research 
quantified the risk of data loss associated with SUAS flight test failures and the 
probability of damage incurred during flight testing. 
 
• Analyzed 20 measurable parameters and identified both statistically significant 
and insignificant factors that affected SUAS failure rates. 
 
• Developed and validated a logistic regression model to predict the probability of a 
flight failure and to quantify the increased or decreased risk associated with 
alternate flight test configurations. 
 
• Developed a model to predict the minimum number of SUAS flights necessary to 
achieve any specified level of expected mission success. 
 
• Proposed targeted and statistically justifiable failure prevention techniques to be 
implemented by test engineers and decision makers to reduce the risk of data loss 
associated with SUAS flight testing. 
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